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Canadian Military Participation In NATO From 1969 to 1983:
An Analysis of Decision-making and Organizational Change
by



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A THESIS

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Dedication

This thesis is dedicated to the memory of Major Albert Reti Kiwi, a friend and the finest soldier with whom I have ever had the privilege to serve, who died tragically in a parachute training accident in Australia in November 1982. To those who knew him well Albi Kiwi epitomized the motto of the unit which he once commanded, 1 Ranger Squadron The New Zealand Special Air Service Regiment: *WHO DARES WINS*

Abstract

This thesis addresses the issue of Canadian military participation in NATO from 1969 to the present. Employing the perspective of decision and organization theory, the central question asked is whether or not decision and organization theory were both misunderstood and misapplied by the Trudeau government, and whether or not these shortcomings have had profound negative long-term consequences for the pursuit of overall policy objectives.

From this research the analysis suggests that the Trudeau government's approach in the context of decision-making and structural change has generally debilitated Canada's defence capabilities, and specifically limited the country's ability to meet its NATO commitment. That process of debilitation has at best been redressed only in a rhetorical sense. This inattention has rendered ineffective in the long-term what was and should have remained a viable input into foreign policy formulation - Canada's participation in NATO and the material military commitment necessary to make that participation credible in the eyes of Canada's NATO allies. The Trudeau government has shown little if any inclination to address this issue and, in practical terms, it may be too late.

Preface

The choice of topic for this thesis stemmed from an interest in the decision-making process; more specifically, in the application of that process to the formulation of foreign policy and the implications for policy implementation. An initial survey of the literature relating to decision theory and decision models led to an interest in what might best be described as **qualifiers** of the decision-making process - organizational process and bureaucratic politics. These areas of theoretical interest stimulated a desire to examine that theory in the light of empirical evidence, preferably in a Canadian context. A personal interest in defence policy and its part or place in the formulation of foreign policy, specifically that relating to NATO, suggested this area as a topic for analysis. The data and time frame were selected because it was felt that they encompassed particular approaches to decision-making, in light of which the elements of decision-making and relevance of the dominant conceptual approaches, including the qualifiers, could be examined. On the basis of preliminary research it became necessary to include a further theoretical perspective, organization theory, because organizational change was the means by which the Trudeau government attempted to operationalize the

decision-making process that it chose to apply. What conceptual implications were derived from the analysis? First, it was found that change occurs incrementally and that neither the models of comprehensive rationality nor incremental decision-making adequately deal with change or the increasing complexities of modern government. The reason for this is that neither of these approaches addresses ends or policy objectives. Second, it was found that organizational process can be disturbed, perhaps even controlled, by a change of organizational leadership, but this disturbance or control is transitory - particularly in departments such as the Department of National Defence where leadership change was frequent. Third, it was found that the effect of bureaucratic politics increased in direct proportion to a decline in interest on the part of political leadership. And lastly, organizational theory was found to have been misunderstood by the Trudeau government and thereby misapplied. What empirical conclusions were reached? It would seem that force of personality or personalities brought about a largely unnecessary change in foreign and defence policy orientation. The government perceived change to be necessary because of a fixation upon a particular approach to decision-making (which proved to be inefficacious), and because of highly subjective political-philosophical inclinations. The change artificially excluded defence issues, for a time, from playing a serious role in foreign policy formulation.

Acknowledgment

I particularly wish to thank Dr. David B. Dewitt for supervising my thesis. Without his encouragement and constructive criticism this work would still be somewhere in the planning stage. I also wish to thank Dr. John K. Kenward and Dr. Gordon Laxer for their insightful critique of the theoretical portion of this thesis, and Dr. F.C. Engelmann who was kind enough to share his office with me for the past two years. To all those in the Department, both staff and students, with whom I have been acquainted my appreciation is also due, for the inspiration which I derived from that association. Lastly, and most importantly, I wish to acknowledge the support and encouragement of the two people without whose understanding and patience this thesis would not have been written: my Mother and my wife Merylee.

Table of Contents

Chapter	Page
I. Introduction	1
II. Theoretical Foundation	8
A. An Analysis of Decision-Making Environments	8
To Understand What Is	8
To Understand What Can Be Done	14
B. Decision-Making Analysis: Dominant Approaches ..	16
Comprehensive Rationalist	17
Incrementalist	19
C. Constraints Upon Policy Decision-making and Implementation	23
Organizational Process	23
Bureaucratic Politics	29
D. Organization Theory - Corporate Planning and Cybernetic Techniques	32
E. Assessment	41
F. Focus	48
III. An Empirical Overview	51
A. Introduction	51
B. Historical Overview	52
Canada And The North Atlantic Treaty Organization: 1949-1969	52
Varying Points Of View	54
After The Force Reduction	65
Continuing Canadian Participation In NATO ...	76
C. Corporate Planning - The Canadian Experience ...	88
Overview	88
Interdepartmental Committee on External Relations	95

Policy Planning and Research Units	97
IV. Analysis	101
A. Introduction	101
B. The Realities of Decision-Making	104
The Demise of Comprehensive Rationality	104
The Influence of Organizational Process and Bureaucratic Politics	108
The Effects of Organizational-Structural Change	116
C. Canadian Military Participation in NATO Since 1969	124
The Need For Review	125
The Aftermath	133
Renewed Interest In NATO	140
Consequences	147
D. Reflections	148
V. Conclusion	150
A. Conceptual Implications	150
B. Empirical Implications	155
C. Present Perceptions and Prescription	163
VI. Bibliography	171

LIST OF TABLES

Table	Description	Page
I	Canada - Schedule of Additional Defence Expenditures	84

I. Introduction

Thus we signed the North Atlantic Treaty on that pleasant spring day in Washington while the band of the U.S. Marines played soft music, including two selections from *Porgy and Bess*: "I got plenty of nothing" and "It ain't necessarily so." (Lester B. Pearson)¹

The general hypothesis of this thesis is that misperception and misapplication of decision theory and organization theory invokes far-reaching, negative consequences for policy formulation and implementation. Specifically, since 1969 such misperception and misapplication by the Trudeau government would appear to have nullified the viable role which defence issues have to play in policy formulation, both domestic and foreign, and has confined Canada's military participation in NATO to a token commitment in men and materiel, supported by little other than rhetoric.

Soon after the election of a Liberal government under Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau in 1968, it became apparent that government attitudes and policy focusses were to be altered radically. Trudeau had served as Minister of Justice in the Pearson government, and he had not been impressed by the incremental and at times ad hoc approach to decision-making, or the informal contacts style of policy planning which had characterized that government. It was

¹John A. Munro and Alex I. Inglis, ed. Mike: The Memoirs of the Right Honourable Lester B. Pearson, Volume 2 1948-1957 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1973), p. 37.

the belief of Trudeau and his advisers that such an approach was, quite simply, incapable of dealing with the increasing complexities of governmental activity. Therefore, it was incumbent upon the government to provide a solution to the problem, and that solution was perceived to lie in a rational ordering of governmental activity, combined with greater central control of that activity. What accounted for this perception? Was it primarily attributable to the personal philosophical inclinations of Mr. Trudeau and his closest advisers?

In the late Sixties and early Seventies, a more positivistic/scientific approach to dealing with policy planning and organizational processes had achieved considerable popularity and authority. A scientific solution to social science problems was the order of the day, a solution which could be implemented through greater rationalization-coordination of governmental activity, corporate policy planning, and policy making in the context of cybernetic techniques.

In terms of Canadian policy making, it will be argued that personal philosophical inclinations and the positivist penchant of the time provided the rationale and the catalyst for change, and that organizational/structural alteration was the instrument by which the process of change was to be operationalized. An important manifestation of the problem which the Trudeau government felt compelled to redress was what was perceived as a misdirection in policy focus. The

Pearsonian era had been characterized by an international emphasis. Indeed, Pearson had been at the forefront of Canada's initial involvement in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and, later, the promotion of Canada as an international mediator and peacekeeper. But by 1969, detente appeared to be working, and the realities of peacekeeping had dampened the original enthusiasm for this pursuit. Was Canada still in a position to play the international role to which it had once aspired? Should it attempt to do so, or was there a need for a fundamental change in policy? The Trudeau government contended that Canadian defence policy, with its emphasis on NATO, epitomized the anachronistic focus of Canadian foreign policy and, worse, that this aberrant defence focus in fact formed the basis of foreign policy.² It is hypothesized that this contention provided the justification for the foreign policy review initiated by the Trudeau government in 1969.

An adjunct to this review was the reassessment of Canada's role in NATO. Canadian military participation in NATO has been the subject of considerable debate on an on again - off again basis for at least the past decade. Indeed, one might contend that in light of Canada's original fixation with a non-military cooperation clause in the NATO contract, there has always been the hope on the part of a

²David B. Dewitt and John J. Kirton, Canada As A Principal Power: A Study In Foreign Policy and International Relations (Toronto: John Wiley & Sons, 1983), pp. 68-83. (Provides in part a synopsis of the Trudeau government's disenchantment with Pearsonian internationalism in the context of the NATO commitment.)

succession of Canadian governments that the military aspects of the Alliance could, in time, be de-emphasized. This de-emphasis, or perhaps more correctly a perception of when circumstances warranted it, underwent a prolonged gestation period. The outbreak of the Korean War and heightening of Cold War tensions which accompanied it, not only reinforced the military importance of the NATO Alliance, but also led to a greater degree of Canadian involvement, in the context of positioning troops and materiel in Western Europe. This forward defence commitment remained relatively unchanged for almost twenty years. However, the Trudeau government's reassessment resulted not only in a change of defence priorities, but also in a substantial reduction of Canada's Western European-based NATO contingent.

The change of defence priorities and relegation of defence to a minor role, if indeed a role at all, in foreign policy planning, was not to last. By the mid-Seventies, one finds that the Prime Minister and a succession of Defence Ministers were rhetorically, if not materially, singing the praises of NATO. The reasons for this change of attitude are, in part, what this thesis endeavours to address. Did the turn-around, such as it was, have its roots simply in external pressures? Were internal pressures involved; that is, were intragovernmental activities a factor? Chapter One provides a discussion of decision theory in the context of comprehensive rationality, incrementalism, organizational process and bureaucratic politics, and organization theory

in the context of corporate planning and cybernetic techniques, and these theoretical reference points provide the basis for an analytic framework. It will be argued that the Trudeau government attempted to apply a comprehensive rational approach to policy decision-making to address the problem of incremental change, as an alternative to the incrementalist approach used by previous governments, and that the government perceived that the influences of organizational process and bureaucratic politics could be controlled by corporate policy planning and cybernetic techniques operating in conjunction with comprehensive rationality.

Chapter Two provides an overview. This consists of an historical discussion of Canadian military participation in NATO from the inception of the Alliance to the present, together with a discussion of the broader organizational/structural and policy planning changes implemented by the Trudeau government which, I intend to argue, underly and are reflected in the historical presentation.

Chapter Three is an analysis of the data contained in Chapter Two, in light of the theoretical considerations which are dealt with in Chapter One. Chapter Four concludes the thesis and contains broad conceptual reflections, observations on why Canadian military participation has followed a particular course since 1969, what the changes in this course imply both conceptually and empirically, and an

element of prescription.

Author's Note

As a student of political science I recognize that it would be possible to employ other approaches to a study of why policy changed. The question might have been examined in the context of an operational code analysis, economic/fiscal restraints on government, domestic politics, or perhaps as part of the systematic contextual changes occurring in the politics of the day. But whatever the approach taken, the fundamental question of policy change, the why and how and with what effect, does not alter. This thesis does not purport to be a comprehensive explanation or by any means the only explanation of why a particular change occurred. Rather it is an explanation, and one which I feel offers some useful insight into the question of policy change for the reasons which I have already discussed.

Whether or not one identifies defence issues, and specifically NATO, as an important consideration in overall policy formulation is very much a value judgment, and my background as a serving officer in the Canadian Armed Forces may be held to bias this judgment. To such a criticism I would reply that a conscious effort has been made to assume the qualities which Max Weber attaches to the passionate politician: devotion to a cause tempered by an objectivity which results from allowing realities to work on one with

inner concentration and calmness.

II. Theoretical Foundation

A. An Analysis of Decision-Making Environments

The purpose of the first section of this chapter is to examine the theoretical bases for the analysis of decision-making in the political and bureaucratic environments. It is intended to highlight the conflicting perceptions of what constitute the intellectual parameters in each environment, and the implications for decision-making which stem from these conflicting perceptions. First, two types of intellectual activity will be discussed, one concerned with understanding what is in the social world as opposed to what ought to be, and the other concerned with what can be done, given the constraints of the first activity. The discussion will focus on the work of political sociologist Max Weber, because it is considered that Weber's political thought constitutes perhaps the most comprehensive analysis of the social world within which politicians and bureaucrats make decisions.³

To Understand What Is

To understand the social world, Weber contends that it is necessary to understand first what is. What is stems

³Key references are as follows: H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, ed. From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), pp. 32 - 77 and 196 - 244. Julien Freund, The Sociology of Max Weber, Mary Ilford, trans. (New York: Vintage Books, 1969), pp. 3 - 86 and 218 - 244. Anthony Giddens, Politics and Sociology In the Thought of Max Weber (London: Macmillan, 1972), pp. 40 - 53.

from social actions, which in turn derive from the infinitely complex combinations of ideas, beliefs and values of the actors in the social world. In terms of governmental activity, the social world can be subdivided into political and bureaucratic components. To reduce further the complexity of what is, Weber posits the formulation of ideal types or models. His particular concern is with the bureaucratic world, and here a model can provide a basis for comparison with what is as opposed to an element of prescription. What then of the political world? "In our world, numerous values and ultimate goals confront each other, and their very pluralism sustains irrationality."⁴ What is in the political world is dictated by the necessity of applying value judgment in the formulation of policy ends. This irrational world of political value judgment is quite different from the *ideally* bureaucratic world, with its inherently rational administrative practices; its rational application of means. Ideally, the political world is value-laden/irrational because it must concern itself with ends in the context of decision-making, while the bureaucratic world is - not discounting bureaucratic politics - value-free/ rational and tends to follow an incremental approach in the decisional process because its focus is necessarily on means. "Like a machine, bureaucracy is the most rational system of harnessing energies to the fulfilment of specified tasks."⁵

⁴Freund, The Sociology of Max Weber, p. 27.

⁵Giddens, Politics and Sociology In the Thought of Max

Thus, to understand what is is to understand the interface between the bureaucratic and political worlds, between rationality and irrationality. It is in the failure to appreciate that the relationship between these worlds is precisely one of interface but not interchange that the problems if not confrontations of political and **superbureaucratic** interaction lie.⁶ Weber rightly contends that to attempt to apply the trappings of rationality to the irrationality of the political world is to indulge in illusion, because to pursue rationality in the political world is to concentrate on means, thereby ignoring the value judgments - the setting of objectives or ends - which is part of **what is** in that world. "Whosoever ... wishes to be free to carry on politics on this earth must above all be free of illusions ...[must understand what is]."⁷

For Weber the illusion which embodies the most serious negative consequences is what he describes as a predilection of Western civilization for rationalization. By rationalization Weber is not subscribing to the rationality of history "... which professedly directs human evolution on a course of universal progress culminating in a sort of

⁵(cont'd) Weber, p. 47.

⁶Colin Campbell and George J. Szablowski, The Superbureaucrats: Structure and Behaviour in Central Agencies (Toronto: Macmillan, 1979). Here I am extrapolating the Campbell and Szablowski **superbureaucrat** theme to include **politically** over-zealous bureaucrats of senior departmental calibre - deputy and assistant deputy ministers.

⁷Giddens, Politics and Sociology In the Thought of Max Weber, p. 46.

feast of reason.⁸ Instead he is referring to what he sees as a peculiarity of Western culture, the product of scientific specialization and technical differentiation - which he sometimes associates with the notion of intellectualization.⁹

It [rationalization] might be defined as the organization of life through a division and coordination of activities on the basis of an exact study of men's relations with each other, with their tools and their environment, for the purpose of achieving greater efficiency and productivity. Hence it is a purely practical development brought about by man's technological genius.¹⁰

Increasing rationalization in the context of the "... the methodical attainment of a definitely given and practical end by the use of an increasingly precise calculation of adequate means....,"¹¹ for all the fact that it is founded upon scientific techniques, does not represent "... an advance in knowledge in the sense of a better understanding of our way of living."¹² Rather it is a focus on the mechanics of progress which catches man up "... in a movement which never stops amazing him and luring him on by fresh promises."¹³ Rationalization as Weber perceives it carries a veneer of optimism which lacks substance because it perpetually promises but never quite delivers, yet it

⁸Freund, The Sociology of Max Weber, p. 18.

⁹Ibid.

¹⁰Ibid.

¹¹Giddens, Politics and Sociology In the Thought of Max Weber, p. 44.

¹²Freund, The Sociology of Max Weber, p. 20.

¹³Ibid., pp. 21-22.

maintains its appeal by suggesting that an answer, if not immediately available, is just around the corner. Its weakness is thus a focus on process rather than product, or on means to the virtual exclusion of ends.

In conjunction with the issue of rationalization it is also pertinent to consider what Weber describes as the pre-eminent qualities which a politician must have: "... passion, a feeling of responsibility, and a sense of proportion."¹⁴ By passion Weber means matter-of-factness; devotion to a cause. Passion is not that sterile excitation which is "... a 'romanticism of the intellectually interesting', running into emptiness devoid of all feeling of objective responsibility."¹⁵ In his devotion to a cause a politician must let responsibility to that cause guide his actions, and for this he requires a sense of proportion - "... the decisive psychological quality of the politician: his ability to let realities work on him with inner concentration and calmness. Hence his distance to things and men."¹⁶ It is distance or detachment which distinguishes the passionate politician in the Weberian sense, "... and differentiates him from the sterilely excited and mere political dilettante."¹⁷ Weber further contends that "... ultimately there are only two kinds of deadly sins in the field of politics: lack of objectivity and - often but not

¹⁴Gerth and Mills, From Max Weber, p. 115.

¹⁵Ibid.

¹⁶Ibid.

¹⁷Ibid.

always identical with it - irresponsibility."¹⁸ This leads one to a consideration of ethically oriented conduct, conduct which is oriented either to an ethic of ultimate ends or an ethic of responsibility. In the former one feels responsible "... only for seeing that the flame of pure intentions is not quenched ...," whereas in the latter one feels accountable for the foreseeable results of one's action.¹⁹ For the politician who pursues the ethic of ultimate ends "... [t]o rekindle the flame ever anew is the purpose of his quite irrational deeds, judged in view of their possible success."²⁰ One can see here the connection between the ethic of absolute ends and rationalization. As Weber succinctly states: "The proponent of an ethic of absolute ends cannot stand up under the ethical irrationality of the world. He is a cosmic-ethical 'rationalist.'"²¹ Can one then prescribe whether a politician should follow an ethic of absolute ends or an ethic of responsibility? The following comment by Weber provides some direction in this regard:

If in these times which, in your opinion, are not times of sterile excitation - excitation is not, after all genuine passion - if now suddenly the "Weltanschauungs"-politicians crop up en masse and pass the watchword, "The world is stupid and base, not I," "The responsibility for the consequences does not fall upon me but upon others whom I serve and whose stupidity or baseness I shall eradicate," then I declare frankly that I would first inquire

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 116.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Ibid., p. 121.

²¹ Ibid., p. 122.

into the degree of inner poise backing this ethic of ultimate ends. I am under the impression that in nine out of ten cases I deal with windbags who do not fully realize what they take upon themselves but who intoxicate themselves with romantic excitations.^{2 2}

To Understand What Can Be Done

The limitations or parameters of what can be done are determined by the rational and irrational natures of the bureaucratic and political worlds respectively. Problems arise when attempts are made to interchange the natures of these worlds. In this regard, the advent of new approaches to dealing with the complexities of the social world generally, such as the systems approach and the planning, programming and budgeting system (PPBS), produced certain unfortunate side effects in their efforts to rationalize political choice. Firstly, there has been a tendency for political actors to take a positivistic approach to their environment, to attempt to discover a rational order through the application of scientific method.^{2 3} The means of scientific method, for example the rational comprehensive model, would define the ends in the context of a rational order. But the goals or ends of policy analysis in the

^{2 2}Ibid., p. 127.

^{2 3}Brian Fay, Social Theory and Political Practice (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1975), pp. 26-27. (Positivism posits that there is an order in the world, and that with the aid of scientific expertise we can discover - objectively - the elements of that order and thereby re-order the world in a more harmonious way.)

political sphere are determined by value judgment-based decisions. To attempt to structure decision-making in such an environment according to a comprehensive rational order is nothing short of an attempt to make the irrational rational, and risks the suppression of the value judgment orientation and the flexibility necessary in the political sphere. Rationalization, by definition, excludes the very issue with which politicians must be concerned - values and ends - and focusses instead on means, the concern of the bureaucratic world. In addition, this misplaced rational activity on the part of political actors has encouraged them to indulge, if only unintended, in what might be described as an over-supervision of, if not undue interference in, the bureaucratic world. This is perhaps not a surprising result when one considers that in such circumstances both politicians and bureaucrats are focussing on means, albeit the former on policy means and the latter on procedural means. Where political leaders do not exercise the prerogative which is rightfully theirs, that of establishing the policy goals to which bureaucratic activity is then directed, the value judgments which are necessarily a part of what is in the political world are left in limbo and the bureaucrat thereby lacks direction or ends towards which the administrative or procedural means of his world can be directed. The result is an attempt by the bureaucracy to second guess political direction, an activity which not only distracts the bureaucrat from the attention

which his own rational environment requires, but also leaves him open to the criticism that he is interfering in the political sphere.

An understanding of what can be done is logically derived from an understanding of what is. One must appreciate that what can be done in the political world is imbued with a measure of flexibility which irrational/value-judgment based decision-making allows. What can be done in the bureaucratic world is subject to the procedural constraints, the routines inherent in rational/objectively based decision-making, and to bureaucratic perceptions of the efficacy of or a predilection for those routines. Just as the bureaucrat must be aware that political considerations are a factor in both his interface with the political world and the policies which he is called upon to administer, so must the politician be aware that bureaucratic factors are a consideration both in policy formulation and implementation. This awareness constitutes the intellectual weaponry of both worlds, much more than any misguided perception that the natures of the political and bureaucratic worlds are interchangeable.

B. Decision-Making Analysis: Dominant Approaches

In this section the two dominant approaches to decision-making will be examined: the comprehensive rationalist approach and the incrementalist approach. The

first is the classic approach to decision-making, and the second posits an alternative to comprehensive rationality - an elusive pursuit in the social world.

Comprehensive Rationalist

Robert Adie and Paul Thomas describe the comprehensive rational approach as "[t]he most widely accepted theory of decision-making in governments"²⁴ In the ideal it leaves out nothing of importance, and the process of comprehensive rationality can be enumerated as follows:

1. The rational decision-maker is faced with a given problem that can be separated from other problems and considered in comparison with them.
2. The rational decision-maker first clarifies his goals or objectives in relation to the problem and then ranks these goals in terms of their importance.
3. He then proceeds to list all the possible consequences that could conceivably follow from each of the alternative policies.
4. He then compares each alternative, with its attendant consequences, with all other alternatives.
5. Finally, the decision-maker chooses the policy alternative that maximizes the attainment of his goals or objectives.²⁵

The many advocates of comprehensive rationality, among the more prominent of whom is Yehezkel Dror, contend that even if all the precepts of the approach cannot be fulfilled, it represents an ideal which decision-makers in the political

²⁴Robert F. Adie and Paul G. Thomas, Canadian Public Administration: Problematical Perspectives (Scarborough, Ont.: Prentice-Hall Canada, 1982), p. 96.

²⁵Ibid., pp. 96-97.

realm should endeavour to approximate as best they can.²⁶

Those who oppose the comprehensive rational approach tend to start from the premise that it cannot be applied to complex problems, and that some means of simplifying the decisional process must therefore be found. Charles Lindblom reinforces this contention when he states that comprehensive rational theory ignores the limitations on decision or policy-making in the political realm. He adds the consideration that decision makers are seldom faced with a given problem, that instead they have to identify/define the nature of the problem, and that even with the most recent advances in decision-making techniques - for example, systems analysis, computers and social forecasting - the analytical requirements for comprehensive rational decision-making simply cannot be completed.

We still do not understand fully the linkages between particular government actions and their impact on society. The information required to consider all possible alternatives and all their consequences simply will not be available. Most government decision-making occurs under pressure of time and often the timeliness of a decision is as important as the thoroughness with which it has been considered.²⁷ Is there an element of positivism in the observation: "We still do not understand fully the linkages...?" The succeeding statement: "The information ... simply will not be available," would seem to suggest otherwise. Lindblom, as an incrementalist, would certainly contend that the cumulative experience to be derived from an incremental approach to decision-making provides some understanding of linkages. However, it is

²⁶Yehezkel Dror, Public Policy Making Re-Examined (San Francisco: Chandler, 1968).

²⁷Adie and Thomas, Canadian public Administration, pp. 96-97.

doubtful that he would contend that full understanding can be achieved, because he perceives of the incrementalist as "... a shrewd, resourceful problem solver who is wrestling bravely with a universe he is wise enough to know is too big for him."²⁸

Additional support for the argument against the utility of the comprehensive rational approach is to be found in the comments of political scientist G. Bruce Doern:

At the heart of the criticism of the rationalist model is the notion that the processes of rationalism involve significant costs, both in time and resources. They imply also that the policy-making means can become ends in themselves, without a decision or a better decision being reached. In short, the rational model can become mired in a getting ready to get ready syndrome.²⁹

Incrementalist

According to Charles Lindblom, the leading prescriptive proponent of the incrementalist approach, governments, confronted with the complexities of modern public policy, resort to an incremental style - a **muddling through** - of decision-making. Lindblom sees this incrementalism as a more realistic, intuitive, unstructured and unsystematic approach than rationalism. Instead of a comprehensive reform program, policy-making occurs through incremental

²⁸Charles E. Lindblom, The Policy Making Process. 2nd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1980), p. 27. (My emphasis)

²⁹G. Bruce Doern, *Recent Changes in the Philosophy of Policy-Making*, Canadian Journal of Political Science 4, 1971, p. 259.

moves, ends and means are adjusted on the basis of experience, and it is a continuous process because there is no single decision or right solution to a problem, in that values, as is the case with circumstances, constantly change.³⁰ How, specifically, does the incrementalist deal with complexity? The process occurs as follows:

1. The incrementalist **simplifies through omission**; he ignores non-incremental policies, does not explore all possible consequences, and discards objectives not attainable by present means.
2. He engages in **satisficing**, adopting policies which will satisfy demands being made and will suffice for the present. There is no exhaustive search for maximum goal fulfillment because it is not worth the costs.
3. He adopts a **remedial approach** whereby he seeks to eliminate known social ills rather than producing some desired state of affairs.
4. He makes use of **feedback** and **next chance**, deliberately choosing a policy which leaves open the possibility of doing better in a subsequent effort, and he builds in feedback to allow for better choice on next chance.
5. He uses **bottlenecks** or delays - an anathema to the rationalist because it suggests a breakdown of the decisional process - to provide a breathing space in which problems can be clarified and action decided upon.³¹

³⁰Adie and Thomas, Canadian Public Administration, p. 98.

³¹Ibid., p. 98.

A qualification of the incrementalist approach is to be found in the work of Fred Kramer, who posits the branch method of policy or decision-making. By this method, exclusions of alternatives are systematic, deliberate, and thereby defensible, and comparisons and policy choice follow a chronological sequence in which policy is made and re-made on a continuum. It is a process of successive approximation to some desired objectives in which those objectives are themselves the subject of continuing change by virtue of reconsideration. Kramer somewhat echoes Lindblom when he observes that neither social scientists, nor politicians, nor public administrators yet know enough about the social world to avoid repeated error. This is not an appeal to positivism but rather suggests that there is a lack of appreciation of the benefits, in terms of cumulative experience/knowledge, which accrue from an incrementalist approach to decision-making. It is Kramer's contention that an astute decision-maker, "... expects that his policies will achieve only part of what he hopes and at the same time will produce unanticipated consequences he would have preferred to avoid."³² He also contends that it is by proceeding through a succession of incremental changes that a decision-maker avoids serious and lasting mistakes.³³ The problem with this process in relation to the politician is that it also avoids the real issue in his decision-making

³²Fred A. Kramer, Perspectives on Public Bureaucracy, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: Winthrop, 1977), p. 145.

³³Ibid., pp. 144-46.

environment, that of ends.

In terms of critics of the incrementalist approach to decision-making, Yehezkel Dror is, not surprisingly, one of the more prominent. He contends that Lindblom's **muddling through** is based on three closely interrelated conditions that are by no means always met in decision-making situations. Firstly, for incrementalism to work, existing policies must be essentially satisfactory so that marginal changes are all that is required to achieve the desired results. If existing policies are not satisfactory and a radical change is required, only a rationalist approach can cope with it. Secondly, the nature of the problem itself can only have changed incrementally as opposed to fundamentally; that is, there must only be a requirement to address means, given that the incremental approach offers no prescription for problems which encompass objectives or ends. Lastly, for incrementalism to be relevant there must be strong continuity in the available means for coping with problems. Thus, if the decision makers possess new technology and/or new knowledge related to the problem, incremental decisions can only be made if they ignore these considerations. In summation, Dror views incrementalism as at best of only limited validity and at worst an approach promoting inertia.³⁴ It thus falls prey to the same limitation which Doern attributes to the comprehensive rational approach, that of getting ready to get ready.

³⁴Dror, Public Policy Making Re-Examined.

C. Constraints Upon Policy Decision-making and Implementation

One might be tempted to conclude that organizational process and bureaucratic politics are of importance only in the bureaucratic world. But they also may be factors in or qualifiers of both policy decision-making and the question of implementation, in as much as the latter is of concern to the political realm. It is therefore pertinent to consider the extent to which these factors may be influential.

Organizational Process

Organizational activity necessitates the coordination of a large number of individuals, and this requires some form of established operating procedures. The latter are characteristic of organizational and not individual behaviour. Graham T. Allison, in Essence of Decision, provides a useful organizational process model, which perceives of governmental behaviour as the resultant of large organizations functioning according to standard operating procedures (SOPs). In order to cope with the wide range of problems with which they are faced, governments, of necessity, delegate primary responsibility for specified problems to a number of large organizations within the government - the departments. Each organization operates relatively independently in its particular area, but there is frequently overlap on important issue areas. Thus it will be apparent that government behaviour on important

issues reflects the independent output of several organizations, coordinated by government leaders. In this regard it is Allison's contention that, "[g]overnment leaders can substantially disturb, but not substantially control the behaviour of these organizations."^{3 5} His analogy of a football team, if one accepts his description of programs and SOPs as the means by which organizational activity is coordinated, seems particularly appropriate. Just as the players on a football team act according to a previously established play which a quarterback has picked to meet a particular situation, so organizations act according to fixed procedures and programs stimulated by directives from government leaders. Programs and SOPs are for the most part subject to gradual change although, like the broken play in football, traumatic occurrences can and do bring about substantial organizational change.

The known behaviour of organizations leads Allison to the formulation of an organizational process paradigm. The basic unit of analysis of the paradigm is based upon a perception of government action as an organizational output. The sequence, alluded to above, is that organizational routines are set in motion by the decisions of government leaders, and these routines culminate in organizational output/governmental activity. These same routines also set the parameters of choice available to government leaders, as do organizational outputs or, perhaps more correctly,

^{3 5}Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision(Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1971), p. 67.

previous outputs. Allison comments:

To one who understands the structure of the situation and the face of the issue - both determined by the organizational outputs - the formal choice of the leaders is frequently anti-climactic.³⁶

In terms of organizational concept, the governmental or organizational process model views the organization not as a monolithic nation or government, but as a conglomerate of organizations over which government leaders preside with respect to policy direction. In this context the conglomerate as an entity acts only when its component organizations perform routines. Of particular importance is the fact that the very size of the conglomerate or government precludes the making of all major decisions or the directing of all major activities by one central authority. This necessitates what Allison calls the factoring of problems or the fractionating of power and, while there are obvious benefits in the form of specialized attention for particular problem areas, the cost of this process is measured in terms of the discretion which must be allowed organizations in the way they respond. As a further consequence of factoring, where organizations are responsible for a very specific problem area, one encounters organizational parochialism. Allison's example of the military services is a particularly pertinent one:

³⁶Ibid., p. 67.

... the military services are manned by careerists on a structural ladder. Promotion to higher rungs is dependent on years of demonstrated, distinguished devotion to a service's mission. Work routines, patterns of association, and information channels combine with external pressures from organized groups and friends in Congress to make quite predictable a service's search for new hardware consistent with currently assigned roles and missions^{3 7}

The resultants of organizational activity are essentially the end products of pre-established routines, the SOPs referred to earlier. Allison makes a useful distinction between the relatively small proportion of SOPs which merely facilitate coordinated activity, and the preponderance which are integral to the fabric of the organization and proportionately more resistant to change. When these programmed responses do change, it is often in the form of a slowly evolved new routine, the rare exceptions being instances where dramatic failures dictate rapid response or adjustment. In such situations, a change of organizational leadership to one more responsive to change would seem to be the norm. Traumas aside, the degree to which government leaders can change the ongoing activity of organizations is very much determined by the individual manipulative abilities of those leaders. In any event, the parameters of choice open to government leaders are fixed by the information, estimates and alternatives which government organizations generate - and each organization ensures that the option list is a short one, a reflection of an

^{3 7}Ibid., p. 81.

organization's desire to control rather than to present choice.

Given that organizations do change, albeit to a lesser rather than a greater extent, what is the pattern of this change and how significant is it? Allison describes the pattern as linear and incremental, but the positive influence of stability created by this pattern is more than offset by certain negative considerations:

New activities typically consist of marginal adaptations of existing programs and activities ... (and) a program, once undertaken, is not dropped at the point where objective costs outweigh benefits. Organizational momentum carries it easily beyond the loss point.³⁸

In a similar vein, while long-range plans are formulated to provide for future uncertainties it would seem that organizational routines continue in isolation from such planning. Where an organization is faced with goals which are equally demanding upon limited resources, the tendency is to proceed with these goals one at a time, resulting in the virtual neglect of certain of them. In situations involving areas where organizational boundaries are ambiguous or in a state of flux, competition for budgetary and man-power resources leads to organizational in-fighting. This process is less a case of change than it is one of empire building, often at the expense of the particular issue being dealt with.

³⁸Ibid., p. 91.

Further to the question of what leaders choose, the stumbling blocks inherent in the restrictions upon this choice are augmented by the fact that a considerable gap may exist between the choice made and what is actually implemented. Allison makes the following observations:

1. Organizations are blunt instruments.
2. Projects that demand that existing organizational units depart from their established programs to perform unprogrammed tasks are rarely accomplished in their designed form.
3. Projects that require coordination of the programs of several organizations are rarely accomplished as designed.
4. Where an assigned piece of a problem is contrary to existing organizational goals, resistance will be encountered.
5. Government leaders can expect that each organization will "do its part" in terms of what the organization knows how to do.
6. Government leaders can expect incomplete and distorted information from each organization about its part of the problem.³⁹

The degree of consideration accorded these administrative feasibilities by government leaders determines the extent of the gap between choice/decision and implementation. And it would follow that on all but pressing issues, the gap would widen in favour of the organization. If one accepts Allison's observations as being generally applicable to government organizations, there would be only one means of significantly closing the overall gap - adroit manipulation of these organizations by a government leader or leaders. Directed change of organizational routines offers an

³⁹Ibid., pp. 93-94.

alternative to manipulation, but major changes of established routines can only be effected over time, a luxury which is afforded to few government leaders. The limitations or constraints on these latter considerations will become apparent in the section which follows - bureaucratic politics.

Bureaucratic Politics

The premise in including a consideration of bureaucratic politics is that whichever of the preceding approaches to decision-making one ultimately finds more persuasive, and taking into account the issues raised in the consideration of the organizational/governmental process, the influence of bureaucratic politics on the decisional process cannot be discounted.

In examining the influence of bureaucratic politics on decision-making, one could start with works of Gabriel Almond and Charles Lindblom in 1950, which provided a formulation of concepts and terms for analyzing U.S. foreign policy as the result of pluralist politics, and an analysis of the mechanism of decentralized coordination.⁴⁰ However, this work and the subsequent efforts of theorists such as Neustadt, Hilsman, Schilling, Huntington and Hammond, have, in the words of Alexander George, been codified and

⁴⁰Gabriel A. Almond, American People and Foreign Policy (New York: 1950), and Charles E. Lindblom, Bargaining? The Hidden Hand in Government, Rand Corporation, 1955, and The Science of "Muddling Through," Public Administration Review 19 (Spring 1959).

explicated by Allison.⁴¹

Allison posits a bureaucratic politics paradigm in which the basic unit of analysis is governmental action as a political resultant. The organizing concepts hinge on the answers to the following questions: Who are the players? What determines each player's stand? What determines the relative influence of each? and How does the game combine stands, influence and moves to yield governmental decisions and actions?⁴² The paradigm infers that actions performed by a nation are the result of bargaining or, perhaps more correctly, gamesmanship among those within government. From the paradigm Allison formulates a bureaucratic politics model. In spite of the complexity of bureaucratic politics, Allison contends that it is possible to identify certain relevant factors and to acquire sufficient information about these factors to be able to offer explanation and predictions.⁴³ Essentially, the bureaucratic politics model relates the how and why of decision-making to the interaction of the players in the political and bureaucratic spheres. There is pulling and hauling among politicians and among politicians and bureaucrats which produces very much of a mosaic resultant.⁴⁴ In this pulling and hauling, the perceptions, beliefs and other organizationally-related

⁴¹Alexander L. George, *The case for multiple advocacy in foreign policy*, American Political Science Review 66 (1972): 758 (footnote 29). Professor George is referring to Allison's Essence of Decision, cited earlier.

⁴²Allison, Essence of Decision, p. 164.

⁴³For a synopsis of these factors see Allison, Essence of Decision, pp. 174-80.

⁴⁴Allison, Essence of Decision, p. 144.

attributes of the players, and not the least the bureaucratic players, are particularly important.

The response to Allison's work has been mixed, but on balance relatively favourable. Morton H. Halperin is supportive of Allison's contention that bureaucratic politics is part of the reality of governmental decision-making, and he adds the consideration that the influence of bureaucratic politics has important implications for policy advice to government.⁴⁵ The importance of bureaucratic politics is also acknowledged by George, who posits a multiple advocacy model as a means of managing bureaucratic competition and producing positive results from it.⁴⁶ Critics of the approach, among the more prominent of whom are Stephen D. Krasner and Robert J. Art, find fault with it on the grounds that its influence is over-emphasized, and that it tends to be more convincing in relation to decision implementation rather than formulation.⁴⁷ Both Krasner and Art contend that the degree of bureaucratic political influence is relative to the degree of executive attention - that is, the greater the attention on the part of the political executive, the less the influence of bureaucratic politics and vice versa. How

⁴⁵Morton H. Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1974), p. 312.

⁴⁶George, *The case for multiple advocacy in foreign policy*, pp. 751-95.

⁴⁷Stephen D. Krasner, *Are bureaucracies important? (or Allison Wonderland)*, Foreign Policy no. 7 (Summer 1972): 159-79, and Robert J. Art, *Bureaucratic Politics and American Foreign Policy: A Critique*, Policy Sciences no. 4 (1973): 467-90.

detrimental is the gap, or slippage as Art describes it, between executive intent and organizational output? For certain types of issues all that matters to the executive is that a positive choice be made; the details of implementation are inconsequential from this perspective and slippage is irrelevant. For other types of issues, those where slippage can hurt, slippage will be detrimental unless executive commitment is there. Lastly, there are those issues where slippage may be desirable from an executive perspective.⁴⁸ On the basis of the criticisms of it, can the influence of bureaucratic politics be dismissed? Art perhaps provides the most objective assessment when he observes that the existence of bureaucratic political influence should not be dismissed, rather it is a question of maintaining a sense of proportion when assessing that influence.⁴⁹

D. Organization Theory - Corporate Planning and Cybernetic Techniques

What is the relevance of organization theory, in the context of corporate planning and cybernetic techniques, to this thesis? It is important conceptually because it is an approach which is ends or objectives oriented; it directs resources/means towards ends in the context of meeting the needs of the people. Thus it may provide an alternative to

⁴⁸ Art, *Bureaucratic Politics and American Foreign Policy: A Critique*, p. 479.

⁴⁹ Ibid., pp. 486-87.

the comprehensive rationalist and incrementalist approaches, which focus solely on means. It is also important to this thesis in an empirical sense, because it is an approach which the Trudeau government purported to apply, in conjunction with greater rationalization, to operationalize the changes which the government held to be necessary.

What is corporate planning? It is difficult to define precisely. It is perhaps best to describe it as an approach which takes an overall view of government activities, and the way that these activities relate to the changing needs and problems with which government is confronted and for which it is considered responsible. Specifically, it involves the development of management, and political processes and structures in order to plan, control and review overall government activity, to meet the the needs of the people to the maximum extent that available resources will allow. Corporate planning thus conveys two fundamental concepts: "... that [government] should consider its resources and activities as a corporate whole and that it should plan and review them in relation to the needs and problems of its environment."⁵⁰

In a traditional sense, the focus of activity in government departments is administration of services. The pressures of day-to-day administration are often such that little if any consideration is given to whether or not a particular service is still required in its existing form.

⁵⁰Robin Hambleton, Policy Planning and Local Government (London: Hutchinson, 1978), p. 45.

As can be appreciated, an administrative activity can become self-perpetuating - an end in itself. And this problem can be reinforced by reforms which are aimed at improving the efficiency of administration, but which do not address the problem of effectiveness. In particular, it must be remembered that bureaucratic effort, once set in motion, is extremely difficult to re-direct. Inherent in bureaucracies is a form of resistance which is not simply passive inertia, but is more clearly a case of opposition to change. This opposition has been aptly described by Donald Schon as **dynamic conservatism**.⁵¹ It might also be labelled bureaucratic politics.

Corporate planning, stressing as it does the need for continuous assessment of the effectiveness of governmental activities, and the impact of the latter upon substantive problems, is posited as a means of addressing the traditional stumbling blocks outlined above. It emphasizes the necessity of learning about what is happening in the environment, and making adjustments on the basis of what is learned. Corporate planning also endeavours to identify changing needs and problems, and to determine the effect which governmental activity will have or is likely to have on these problems. Consequently, it is concerned with what is achievable. The focus is on policy content and the processes by which policy is formulated, implemented and

⁵¹ Donald A. Schon, Beyond the Stable State (London: Temple Smith, 1971), as cited in Hambleton, Policy Planning and Local Government, pp. 46-47.

evaluated.

How then is corporate planning applied? The first step is usually the preparation of a position statement, which encompasses current activities, policies and commitments. Why are position statements important? The reason is twofold:

First, as straightforward information they have a valuable role in clarifying: what the authority is doing, what it is trying to achieve, for whom, by when and where, with what success and at what cost [government officials may not be and often are not au fait with precisely what a government's position is on certain issues]. Second, the process of preparing the statements can be more important than the statements themselves. If it is handled in the right way the work of uncovering and assembling the information can educate [politicians and administrators] alike.^{5 2}

This importance notwithstanding, there is a potential danger in the formulation of position statements. The danger is that they may be formulated purely to pay lip-service to the planning requirement they represent, with little thought having been given to the way they will be used or misused.

Once position statements on the various issues have been formulated, policy or issue analysis - a systematic investigation of a particular policy area - is implemented as a means of introducing or developing the corporate planning process. The issues to be analyzed and the priority of analysis should be determined by elected representatives - the politicians who are responsible for

^{5 2}Hambleton, Policy Planning and Local Government, p. 58. (My emphasis).

the value-laden judgments which are a necessary part of the political world. Where these ground rules are not adhered to, where an attempt is made to interchange the natures of the political and bureaucratic worlds, problems arise. Bureaucrats are encouraged to extend their activities into the political realm, not in terms of proffering policy advice as is rightly expected of them, but rather in terms of substituting organizational values for the value judgments which politicians have not seen fit to address. The political realm is an area in which bureaucrats, as rational actors, are ill-equipped to operate and for which they have no mandate - being appointed rather than elected officials. The practical effect on corporate planning is that it becomes coopted by the bureaucracy, and attention is refocussed on the efficiency rather than on the effectiveness of administration and policy. It also should be noted that the selection of an issue is at least as important as the selection of a course of action upon completion of analysis. The selection of the issue, "... involves choosing all those areas which will not be investigated and is, thus, a more significant demonstration of corporate priorities than selection of options resulting from a report with particular terms of reference."⁵³ That issues and the priority of their analysis should be determined by politicians, rather than be delegated directly or by default to bureaucrats, cannot be overemphasized.

⁵³ Ibid.

Having considered what corporate planning is, and how it is or should be applied, it is pertinent to consider not only the general criticisms of corporate planning but also how these criticisms may be addressed. One of the criticisms is that corporate planning has often been applied mechanistically. Essentially, structural change and the introduction of new procedures have been over-emphasized, with the result that an impression rather than the reality of corporate planning has been created. A mechanistic application is totally unsatisfactory because it nullifies the learning approach which is the very essence of corporate planning. How can a mechanistic emphasis be rectified or avoided? Hambleton poses a useful set of questions which the political executive might ask themselves in order to address this problem:

First, how well does their approach stand up to uncertainty? Do changes in the environment ... send corporate planning principles to the wall or is there sufficient commitment and elasticity to cope with changes of this kind? Second, how far does their approach ensure implementation and follow through of corporate policy? Is implementation a mysterious process of sales and persuasion or is there (also) an "effective" monitoring system which discloses and explains deviations from policy? Third, just what is the "content" of [government] policy? How far is corporate planning actually forming and developing what actually gets done by the [government]?^{5 4}

A second criticism of corporate planning activity is that much of it has been built at the centre of government

^{5 4}Ibid., p. 62.

by the centre. This discounts the fact that a great deal cannot be learned at the centre of an organization. Those at the centre who consider themselves **informed** in the context of the subtleties of new ideas and developments will likely approve innovations in governmental activity. But what about those on the periphery, to which cabinet ministers partly belong because of their departmental affiliations? At the very least they are likely to be unenthusiastic and lack commitment to the innovations; at worst they may engage in active opposition - most probably in the form of cooption. The very fact that certain individuals are set apart as corporate planners at the centre of an organization in itself creates a problem. It gives the impression that corporate planning is carried out by appointed officials who are, by virtue of their location and philosophical identification with the political leadership, remote from the corporate entity on which they depend for information. And, the establishment of large, highly centralized corporate planning units lends credence to this impression. What then is the answer to the criticism of over-centralization of corporate planning? The answer might be the creation of smaller planning units which, rather than imposing a centrist line, would act as a catalyst in releasing the creative potential of the various departments. In Hambleton's words, these units, "... would seek to enable not to impose."^{5 5} However, there is a need

^{5 5}Ibid., p. 63.

for an involvement in corporate planning activity which extends beyond that of central planning units.⁵⁶

A third criticism of corporate planning concerns its lack of success in promoting collaborative or inter-corporate planning in the government system. This criticism is related to concern about the over-centralization of planning units. In both instances the problem is the result of a perception, on the part of the government departments, of the planning unit as a threat to vested interests. Given that there is an on-going communication between departments on matters of common interest, one might well ask why this communications link would not extend to the planning unit. The answer is to be found in the consideration of common interest. Government departments, individual interests notwithstanding, communicate with each other on matters of common interest in the knowledge that each knows - because they are both part of the bureaucratic sector - the extent to which the other may be constrained by particular concerns on an issue. Such departments see no commonality of interest with a planning unit which they perceive as an imposition on rather than as a part of the system, and which, because of its proximity to the centre of government, constitutes a threat to their relationship with that centre. One must then return to the role of the planning unit being one of enabling rather than imposing. A flexible network of contacts must be used to

⁵⁶Ibid., pp. 62-63.

demonstrate gradually the usefulness rather than the threat of corporate planning units. In essence, "... planning must not simply make demands on the established system but seek to generate support as well."⁵⁷

Still another criticism of corporate planning practice concerns the question of values - specifically, political values. A corporate planning unit might conceivably be able to ignore the conflict which its creation invariably causes, if it has a very high degree of central political support and if integrative values are firmly entrenched in the government system. However, the success of such an approach is at best transitory. Other more immediate issues than corporate planning arise to claim the attention of the political executive, and a department-based system lacks the necessary integrative values. It is necessary to build a wide political basis of support, through the demonstration of usefulness referred to above, because, "... identification with one political personality in a department-based system can be fatal to long-term survival. It is not only essential to be near the heart of government ... but also be seen as servicing the government as a whole and not one individual's career."⁵⁸

⁵⁷K.H.F. Dyson, *Planning and the Federal Chancellor's Office in the West German Federal Government*, Political Studies 21, (1973): 360.

⁵⁸Ibid., p. 361.

E. Assessment

In light of the discussion of the social world and the consideration of the dominant approaches to and organizational influences upon policy or decision-making, what questions have been answered about the decisional process and how to approach it? Equally importantly, what questions remain unanswered?

First of all the decision-maker must as Weber observes, "... resign himself to the loss of 'ideals' of radical revolutionary change: indeed he must abandon the conceivability of such a goal."⁵⁹ This involves the appreciation of the futility of indulging in the pursuit of something which cannot be achieved - comprehensive rationality or complete understanding of the real world. This is not meant to suggest that the pursuit of change per se is futile, for the politician has recourse to the quality of passion. In this passion or devotion to a cause the politician must maintain a sense of objectivity or detachment which will allow him to overcome the subjective influences of personal inclinations or the obsequious posturings of advisers. Furthermore, he must follow an ethic of responsibility which will ensure that the pursuit of pure intentions does not over-shadow a feeling of accountability for the foreseeable results of his actions. Thus the passion of the politician is that which enables him to pursue change objectively. It is not passion in the

⁵⁹Giddens, Politics and Sociology In the Thought of Max Weber, p. 46.

sense of a single-mindedness which obscures the politician's ability to let realities work on him, nor is it passion in the sense of an infatuation with that which is intellectually interesting but which has little regard for what can be done in the social world.

It is also a question of realizing that to attempt to rationalize the political world is to exclude the value judgments which are an inherent or inevitable component of that world. To exclude these judgments is to dehumanize the political world and to ignore the real world. To reiterate an earlier quote, "Whosoever ... wishes to carry on politics on this earth must be free of all illusions."⁶⁰ And a part of being free of all illusions is to reject the romanticism of the intellectually interesting, the fascination of scientific method and the ethereal promise of success, and to acknowledge responsibility or accountability for the real consequences of one's actions.

Kramer notes that "... [i]t is a matter of common observation that in Western democracies policies [change] almost entirely through incremental adjustments."⁶¹ If incremental change is the norm, does this mean that fundamental change cannot be effected? Is a decision-maker then compelled to follow an incremental approach? Incrementalism may well describe the normal process of change in the social world, but this does not preclude fundamental change because the politician still has passion.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ Kramer, Perspectives on Public Bureaucracy, p. 143.

However, whether or not fundamental change will be achieved is dependent upon how this passion is manifested. It must be, as mentioned earlier, passion in the Weberian context of devotion to a cause tempered by objectivity. If one accepts that fundamental change can be achieved, one may conclude that the decision-maker is not confined to an incremental approach. This is an important consideration in light of the weaknesses which are inherent in an incremental approach to decision-making: no room for passion in a Weberian context, an emphasis on means to the exclusion of ends, the discounting of objectives which cannot be met by present means and thereby the rejection of responsibility for the long-term effects of one's actions, and the virtual reduction of politics to a procedure. In a prescriptive context the incremental approach has little to offer because it reduces the politician merely to an advocate of a procedure, and because it is prone to the same criticism which Doern applies to the rationalist model, policy-making means become ends in themselves and a getting ready to get ready syndrome eventuates. It thus becomes just another model of rationalization.

Does this lend credence to the viability of what Adie and Thomas describe as the most widely accepted theory of decision-making in governments, the comprehensive rational approach? It does not because the comprehensive rational model is mistaken about the nature of the social world. It purports to define ends through the application of

scientific rational thought, but by definition rationalization excludes values and ends and focusses on means. Thus the comprehensive rationalist approach is no more efficacious than the incrementalist approach, and the politician who would pursue it is displaying that passion which is a romanticism of the intellectually interesting. Such a politician may be held to be guilty of Weber's two deadly sins in the field of politics: lack of objectivity and irresponsibility - the latter because a focus on means to the exclusion of ends allows the politician to disclaim responsibility for the foreseeable results of his actions.

However, it is also important to acknowledge two advantages afforded by the comprehensive rational approach, advantages at least to the politician. First, the approach provides a measure of political escapism in that it allows the politician to mechanistically focus on process/means at the expense of product/ends. This effectively abrogates his responsibility for deciding value oriented ends because the focus on means precludes the former from ever really being addressed. Second, the approach allows the politician to control the bureaucracy in the sense that his mechanistic focus on means is thereby a focus on the stuff of bureaucratic activity.

What of the influence of governmental or organizational process? The very complexity of government precludes one central authority from making all decisions or directing all activities, would seem to be a reasonable one. Where

problems are factored or power is fractionated to deal with this complexity, organizational process becomes important, particularly in terms of policy implementation, because government organizations base most of their activity on routines or SOPs. The questions of organizational parochialism, and the susceptibility of organizations to change and the means by which such change may be effected, can be best assessed by reference to empirical data. Such a description is, in part, the subject of Chapter Three. The purported gap between decision and implementation, a consideration which overlaps with bureaucratic politics, is perhaps the most important and potentially harmful result of organizational process factors, and its presence or absence can only be determined empirically.

What part do bureaucratic politics play in all of this? It is first of all a part of what is in the context of the interface between the bureaucratic and political worlds. Secondly, it is a limitation on what can be done at this interface. It is perhaps less in itself an approach to analyzing decision-making, than it is a qualification of any analysis of the decisional process. It is thus important in terms of the effect it may have on bureaucratic advice to politicians and on the implementation of policy decisions. How important is it? One must, as Robert Art suggests, view bureaucratic politics with a sense of proportion. But it does exist, and the extent to which it is ignored can have, in varying degree, important consequences for the analysis

or the practice of decision-making.

What of corporate policy planning? It is apparent that corporate planning has by no means all been consensual. A challenge to traditional methods, corporate planning has often been met with the response referred to earlier as dynamic conservatism - a manifestation of bureaucratic politics and the departmentalized approach to policy development and implementation. While there have been obvious examples of this response, such as ignoring, counter-attacking, containing, or isolating, a more common approach has been to absorb or coopt corporate planning. This process has been aptly described as, "... the government bureaucracies' magnificent semi-conscious system for long-term wearing down of agents of change."⁶² Ideally, cooption occurs without any realization on the part of the corporate planning unit that such a process is occurring. This dynamic conservatism may be explained, at least in part, by the circumstances of a particular situation. The personalities involved - in the context of both planning and implementation and response - may have been critical, the timing of implementation may have been wrong, or other issues perceived as more pressing concerns may have arisen and diverted political attention. But is this sufficient explanation? It may be that not enough attention has been paid to either the reality of dynamic conservatism or, a more fundamental consideration, the reality of implementing

⁶²Schon, Beyond the stable state, p. 15, as cited in Hambleton, Policy Planning and Local Government, p. 67.

change. The focal point or goal of change has been the development of learning organizations - specifically, government bureaucracies which are sensitive to changing needs and capable of ongoing adaptation of their needs and behaviour. Bureaucratic shortcomings have tended to be perceived as the result of a lack of rationally ordered activity in these organizations, but as Hambleton observes: "Perhaps the rational approach, even when coupled with good inter-personal relationships, is not enough to develop a learning organization."⁶³ This observation is supported by Donald Schon, who contends "... that the recognition of dynamic conservatism explodes the 'rational myth' of intervention which sees social change as a process made up of analysis of objectives, examination of alternatives, and selection of the most promising routes to change."⁶⁴

What would seem to be required is not rationalization of the policy or decision-making process, but rather the encouragement or development of a government system which will, in a cybernetic sense, learn how to learn. "Planning [per se] can lead all too easily to neat structures and tidy methods at the expense of content."⁶⁵ Planning which seeks to enable rather than to impose, which acts as a catalyst in releasing the creative potential of government departments, is corporate planning in its most efficacious form. This is

⁶³Hambleton, Policy Planning and Local Government, p. 68.

⁶⁴Schon, Beyond the Stable State, p. 30, as cited in Hambleton, Policy Planning and Local Government, p. 68.

⁶⁵Dyson, Planning and the Federal Chancellor's Office in the West German Federal Government, p. 358.

the form in which it should be properly perceived, as an alternative to both incrementalism and comprehensive rationality.

F. Focus

In a broad conceptual sense governments are faced with choosing between a pursuit of the ideal in decision-making, as Dror would advocate, or the acknowledgment of what can be done in the social world. In addition, there is the question of the influence of organizational activity in terms of both routine procedures and bureaucratic politics. The approach to decision-making which a government chooses, the organizational/structural changes which are applied to operationalize that approach, and the extent to which that government discounts or acknowledges existing organizational influences are matters of no little consequence not only for the effectiveness of the government but also for the nation in the long-term.

The preceding assessment of theoretical approaches comes down on the side of incrementalism as a description of change in the social world. One might therefore contend that an approach to decision-making which ignores this reality and which indulges in the romanticism of the intellectually interesting, will not overcome incrementalism for reasons which have been discussed in the theoretical treatment of incrementalism, rationalization and the qualities of the politician, and will be potentially

damaging to long-term policy considerations because such considerations will in fact not be addressed. Similarly, an approach which simply gives in to incrementalism offers no solution in terms of bringing about social change; instead it represents, as Dror rightly observes, inertia. It would also seem that organizational processes and bureaucratic politics may play an important role, if not in the decision-making process then certainly in terms of implementation, and particularly so if a government underestimates or ignores the effects of these activities.

The time frame on which this thesis focusses affords a unique opportunity to compare theory postulations with empirical evidence. Indeed, theory must be verified by empirical evidence, and this evidence can be best adduced from an analysis of circumstances which involved the choice or rejection of one or another of the dominant approaches to decision-making, and the consequences of this choice. For "[i]n an era in which every 'scientist' claims the right to impose his or her own theory on an unsuspecting reality, what is most trustworthy is not the immense variety of theories, each in the pay of a would be master, but the shared empirical reality with which everyone living life must deal." "Canadian military participation in NATO from 1969 to the present reflects an attempt by the Trudeau government to initiate a fundamental change in foreign and defence policy orientation, a change which was perceived to

“Ralph P. Hummel, The Bureaucratic Experience (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1977), p. 213.

be necessary because of the cumulative and out-dated effects of incremental decision-making, and for which the remedy was held to be a rationalization of the decision-making process operationalized through structural change. The operationalization process was labelled corporate planning. "Solutions existed for all problems if only adequate structures and processes were in place to anticipate, to plan and to coordinate government activity. 'Corporate planning' ... [was] thought to be necessary and achievable for all."⁶⁷ From the empirical data which follows it is anticipated that certain questions may be answered: Are the preceding hypotheses concerning approaches to decision-making valid? Are the effects of organizational process and bureaucratic politics on policy formulation and implementation evident in the activities and responses of the departments encompassed in the empirical data - specifically, the Departments of National Defence (DND) and External Affairs (DEA)? Did the organizational/structural alterations which were applied enhance the process of change or hinder it? What sort of change was really required in light of the empirical evidence? And lastly, what were the consequences of the government's actions for long-term policy objectives or ends?

⁶⁷Michael J. Prince and John A. Chenier, *The rise and fall of policy planning and research units: an organizational perspective*, Canadian Public Administration 23 no. 4 (Winter 1980): 531.

III. An Empirical Overview

A. Introduction

The aim of this chapter is twofold: to survey the secondary sources of information on Canadian foreign and defence policy formulation and implementation as it pertained to Canadian participation in NATO from 1969 to the present, and to examine the organizational changes implemented by the Trudeau government which had ramifications for foreign and defence policy formulation and implementation. The time frame was chosen on the basis that 1969 ostensibly marked a watershed in policy formulation. To provide some insight into why the government deemed changes to be necessary, and in the interest of historical continuity, an overview of Canadian participation in NATO since the Alliance's inception is also provided. The chapter consists of two parts: The first part is an overview of Canadian participation in NATO, which collates the commentary and analysis of Canadian academics and government officials, and academics and officials of other member nations of the Alliance, and touches briefly on Eastern European reaction. It also includes an examination of NATO spin-offs in a political and economic context. The second part examines corporate planning as practiced by the Trudeau government, not only from a broad perspective, but also in the context of the implications which this planning held for DND and hence Canadian military participation in NATO.

B. Historical Overview

Canada And The North Atlantic Treaty Organization: 1949-1969

On 4 April 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty was signed in Washington. The signatories were, in addition to the Treaty of Brussels nations, Italy, Portugal, Denmark, Iceland, Norway, the U.S. and Canada. In 1952, Greece and Turkey were added and the Federal Republic of Germany followed in 1955. The depth of Canada's commitment is best illustrated by the following statement made by Prime Minister Louis St.Laurent in 1948:

We believe that it must be made clear to the rulers of the totalitarian communist states that if they attempt by direct or indirect aggression to extend their police states beyond their present bounds by subduing any more free nations, they will not succeed unless they can overcome us all.⁶⁸

However, good intentions aside, a measure of prophecy is perhaps to be found in the comment of Lester Pearson:

Thus we signed the North Atlantic Treaty on that pleasant spring day in Washington while the band of the U.S. Marines played soft music, including two selections from Porgy and Bess: "I got plenty of nothing" and "It ain't necessarily so".⁶⁹

It is appropriate to consider how Canadian participation in NATO came to include the stationing of troops in Europe. Following World War Two, the Canadian

⁶⁸Ibid., p. 21.

⁶⁹Munro and Inglis, Mike, p. 37.

military reverted to its peacetime configuration of small, but highly professional formations. It was not anticipated that such forces would be stationed outside Canada in the foreseeable future. However, the out-break of the Korean War brought about a dramatic change in this regard. Not only did Canadian troops participate in the Korean conflict, which required substantial increases in military organization and expenditure, but there also arose a call from NATO for a temporary deployment of Canadian troops as part of European defence. The then commanding officer of NATO, General Dwight Eisenhower, a highly respected figure in both military and political circles, came to Canada to state the NATO case. A combination of Eisenhower's powers of persuasion and a belief that the commitment would be terminated when the European nations had realized their economic and military potential, served to convince the St. Laurent government. The first commitment of Canadian troops to Europe occurred in 1951, and consisted of a brigade of infantry, 11 squadrons of fighter aircraft, naval support and economic assistance.

... [I]t was meticulously delivered. Troops were en route within months. The squadrons followed three at a time from early 1952 until April 1953. Canada was one of the few nations that abided by the proposed schedules ...⁷⁰

From the time of its deployment in 1951 until 1970, Canada maintained a contingent of some 10,000 troops - soldiers and

⁷⁰Ibid., p. 29.

airmen - in Europe. In addition to this commitment, an air-transportable brigade group was allocated on an as-required basis for service on NATO's northern flank, essentially, Norway.

Varying Points Of View

A Need For Change

In early 1969, the Trudeau government announced that a complete review of defence and foreign policy was to be conducted, with a view to "... rectifying what the Prime Minister described as Canada's capsized foreign political pyramid."⁷¹ In a speech delivered to a gathering of Alberta Liberals in Calgary on April 12, 1969, Mr. Trudeau observed:

NATO, a military organization, had in the past determined Canada's defence policy, which had in turn determined the country's foreign policy. We had "no foreign policy of any importance except that which flowed from NATO, ... and this is a false perspective for any country." What the government was attempting to do, he explained, was to "stand the pyramid on its base" instead of its head - "to review our foreign policy and to have a defence policy flow from that, and from that defence policy to decide which alliances we want to belong to, and how our defences should be deployed."⁷²

⁷¹Ulrich Strempel, *Towards Complex Interdependence: Canada and the European Community: 1958-1980*, unpublished PhD dissertation, University of Alberta, Spring 1982.

⁷²Bruce Thordarson, *Trudeau and Foreign Policy: A Study In Decision-Making* (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1972), pp. 139-140.

The Prime Minister went on to say, in a foreshadowing of the later White Paper, that the government's first concern was sovereignty - and all that implied. Bruce Thordarson comments that the fixation on sovereignty "... appears to have been inspired by the belief that defence policy had to be based on interests that were more North American-oriented than were contributions to world peace and security through participation in NATO."⁷³ This position, of course, implied a reassessment of roles for Canada's armed forces, but Trudeau justified this reassessment on the grounds that it "... was intended to reassure CAF [Canadian Armed Forces] personnel, and especially to convince the public, that there was a valid role for armed forces in Canada."⁷⁴ In the light of Prime Minister Trudeau's concern that defence policy should flow from foreign policy, it is somewhat ironic that the decision to establish new defence priorities and to revise Canada's NATO contribution was reached some 14 months prior to Foreign Policy For Canadians, the series of government papers delineating the new approach to foreign policy. This sequence was dictated by budgetary planning considerations, and by the fact that the annual review of NATO was pending, in which member nations would submit firm military commitments for one year and projected commitments for the succeeding five years. That NATO was fixed as the major issue of Canadian defence policy was not surprising, for it was the issue which attracted the greatest interest

⁷³ Thordarson, Trudeau and Foreign Policy, pp. 140-41.

⁷⁴ Ibid., p. 141.

among foreign policy critics, a group which included Prime Minister Trudeau. For those who favoured a new foreign policy, NATO symbolized the status quo - a U.S. dominated alliance, a power bloc which diminished Canadian credibility in both the Third World and in peacekeeping, and an endless drain on resources which could be devoted to foreign aid. Additionally, there were those - Mr. Trudeau among them - who believed that it was inappropriate for a country of Canada's stature to have troops stationed in Europe - "to maintain a forward defence position..."⁷⁵ But for those who took the opposite view, NATO symbolized the best aspects of Canada's international approach - a concern for European stability, emphasis on enhancing influence with NATO allies and using it to encourage diplomatic imagination and military caution, and the search for a counterbalance to offset dependence on the U.S. - a contention to which Mr. Trudeau would later be forced to subscribe.⁷⁶ As Lester Pearson had once said, "We did not want to be alone with our close friend and neighbour. As a debutante on the world stage we were worried, not about rape but seduction."⁷⁷

Essentially, the Trudeau government was faced with six options:

1. Adopt a policy of non-alignment, which would mean withdrawal from both NATO and NORAD [North American Air Defence Agreement].

⁷⁵Harald von Riekhoff, *The impact of Prime Minister Trudeau on foreign policy*, International Journal 33 no. 2 (Spring 1978): 272.

⁷⁶Thordarson, Trudeau and Foreign Policy, p. 122.

⁷⁷Munro and Inglis, Mike, Volume 2, p. 33.

2. Withdraw from NATO but remain in NORAD.
3. Remain in NATO but withdraw all forces from Europe.
4. Remain in NATO but reduce the number of troops in Europe.
5. Remain in NATO with present force strength.
6. Remain in NATO and increase the size of the force in Europe.^{7 8}

The NATO issue ostensibly went to the root of Canada's foreign policy philosophy, and the government felt compelled to widen the scope of involvement in policy formulation, and thus the opinions not only of Parliament but also of academics and other members of the public were solicited. In early 1969 the Common's Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence conducted an in-depth examination of the country's NATO policy. The Committee undertook to expose itself to the widest possible variety of opinions. It heard testimony from such noted academics as Professors James Eayrs of the University of Toronto, Kenneth McNaught, also of the the University of Toronto, Michael Brecher of McGill, John Warnock of the University of Saskatchewan, Jack Granatstein of York University, and Stephen Clarkson of Toronto. Their views ranged from complete withdrawal from NATO and a position of non-alignment, to the creation of a mobile peacekeeping force and an emphasis on foreign aid rather than military spending. However, the Committee was largely unconvinced by their testimony, and the reasons are noteworthy:

^{7 8}Thordarson, Trudeau and Foreign Policy, p. 122.

Ian Wahn [Committee Chairman] later remarked that if there was one factor that discredited these critics in the eyes of the Parliamentarians, it was their anti-Americanism. Douglas Harkness also noted that the politically conscious Members of Parliament realized that the Canadian public would never accept a foreign policy based on hostility towards the United States, nor would it favour withdrawal from NATO and NORAD or even a massive increase in foreign aid.⁷⁹

In order to ensure a balanced testimony, the Committee listened to eight witnesses who generally favoured Canadian participation in NATO. Of these, three were non-Canadians who contended that Canada's military contribution, while largely symbolic, was still important, and that a Canadian withdrawal might precipitate the withdrawal of other members. The remainder consisted of a serving Major-General, the former Deputy Minister of Defence Production, the former Chairman of the Defence Research Board, the one academic who strongly favoured participation in NATO, Professor Albert Legault of the Universite de Laval, and retired General Charles Foulkes, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee. General Foulke's testimony, which recommended retention of a mobile formation based in Europe, introduced the question of Arctic sovereignty, and in addition observed that Canada would do well to cater for the means of controlling civil disorders of the sort with which other countries had been plagued, apparently elicited considerable attention from Committee members. The Committee visited Europe as part of the

⁷⁹Ibid., p. 130. (My emphasis)

closing stages of its deliberations, and the general European view - very much in favour of a continuing Canadian military presence in Europe - had a profound influence. Two meetings were particularly influential:

The first was a private session with the German Defence Minister, Helmut Schmidt, who, despite his socialist affiliation, emphasized the value of NATO as an instrument of detente. The other was a meeting with members of the Swedish Committee on Foreign Affairs, who, although representatives of a neutral country, all asked that Canada remain in Europe.⁸⁰

The Committee submitted its final report to the House of Commons on 25 March 1969, and in essence the report recommended continued Canadian membership in NATO, continued maintenance of troops in Europe, and the continuance of the present roles of the latter until such time as equipment reached obsolescence in 1972 - at which time a reassessment of future military roles should occur.⁸¹

While the Standing Committee was at work, Prime Minister Trudeau and his cabinet also endeavoured to familiarize themselves with the views of Canadian academics. The latter were apparently less than impressed by Mr. Trudeau's response to their views, and a seminar conducted at Hull for select members of the academic community and government officials enjoyed a similar lack of success:

The academics did not raise any strenuous objections and the officials concluded that the government had

⁸⁰Ibid., p. 133.

⁸¹Ibid., p. 135.

won its case. What [they] did not realize was that most of the academics had remained relatively silent only because they regarded the government's presentation to be so preposterous, and the views of the officials so fixed, that discussion would have been meaningless.^{8 2}

Leaving nothing to chance, the civil service departments concerned with foreign affairs, through the inter-departmental Special Task Force on Relations with Europe (STAFFEUR) established at Mr. Trudeau's direction, also reviewed Canadian-European relations. The government was concerned that there be a reassessment of these relations in the political and economic spheres, with which defence commitments were "inevitably intermingled."^{8 3} The STAFFEUR study was complete in early 1969, and the recommendations are noteworthy:

...[T]he Task Force concluded that Canada should continue to station troops in Europe since it was in Canada's economic and political, as well as military interests to be actively involved on the continent.^{8 4}

And while STAFFEUR deliberated, the Departments of External Affairs and Defence conducted their own joint study of the same subject. The difficulties and costs of maintaining and replacing military equipment, Canada's obligations abroad, and a series of options ranging from neutrality to greater commitment to NATO, were mooted. Essentially, the

^{8 2}Ibid., p. 126.

^{8 3}Ibid., p. 135.

^{8 4}Ibid., p. 136.

conclusions echoed those of STAFFEUR: Canadian military activities in Europe should continue.

Prime Minister Trudeau was content with neither the STAFFEUR report nor that of External Affairs/Defence. With the Standing Committee report pending, he asked his own advisers, chaired by former professor Ivan Head, to re-examine the whole question of Canada's military policy. This group submitted **Canadian Defence Policy - a Study:**

It apparently contained the recommendations that Canada remain in NATO, retain in Europe approximately 3,000 men out of its existing 9,800-man contingent, and abandon its nuclear-strike role.^{8 5}

On 3 April 1969, Mr. Trudeau announced the government's decision Canada would remain in NATO, but there would be a planned and phased reduction of the Canadian contingent stationed in Europe, this to be conducted in consultation with Canada's NATO allies. Additionally, Canada's defence priorities were defined as follows:

1. the surveillance of our own territory and coast-lines - i.e. the protection of our sovereignty;
2. the defence of North America in co-operation with United States forces;
3. the fulfilment of such NATO commitments as may be agreed upon;
4. the performance of such international peace-keeping roles as we may, from time to time assume.^{8 6}

^{8 5}Ibid., p. 137.

^{8 6}Ibid., p. 139.

While it was by no means a decisive factor, it is interesting to note where public opinion lay on the NATO issue. A survey conducted by the Canadian Institute of Public Opinion and released on 11 December 1968, revealed that 64 percent of those questioned believed that Canadian forces should be left in Europe. There was of course some regional variation, with support for maintaining troops running as high as 70 percent in the West. Even in Quebec, where Canadian isolationist sentiment predominated, 55 percent supported the commitment.⁸⁷ Peter C. Dobell, then the Director of the Parliamentary Centre for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade, deemed the following to be a primary reason for this general Canadian support:

In the past Europeans needed Canada's support; now Canadians need links with Europe in order to balance the influence of the United States. However, the European countries are preoccupied with problems relating to European unity. This means that every instrument for developing the relationship is important. As long as the Europeans attach importance to NATO, a Canadian contribution to the alliance is a significant Canadian connection with Europe. Canada now needs contact with Europeans rather than vice versa, and NATO is an important element in this contact.⁸⁸

Mr. Trudeau's concern that defence policy stem from foreign policy notwithstanding, the impetus for a review of Canada's role in NATO had earlier beginnings. Lester Pearson, Trudeau's predecessor, had played a major role in

⁸⁷ Peter C. Dobell *Canada and NATO*, ORBIS 13 (Spring 1969): 321.

⁸⁸ Ibid.

Canada's initial commitment to NATO, and he was prepared to the end of his administration "to preach in philosophic terms the gospel of Atlantic unity."⁸ Pearson had some doubts about the existing troop commitment, but he was reticent to take action on the basis of these doubts:

While Pearson privately and even in public in his last years in office questioned the need for the continuing presence of Canadian forces in Europe, he was not of a mind to take the determined steps necessary to give effect to his personal doubts.⁹

But for Pierre Trudeau, a generation younger than Pearson and unaffected by the emotional links with Europe which the experience of two world wars had bestowed on the latter, there were no such inhibitions. In a speech delivered in Calgary on 12 April 1969, Trudeau stated that, "Canada had no foreign policy of any importance except that which flowed from NATO and this is a false perspective for any country."¹⁰ Henceforth, because Canada's foreign policy was to serve national interests, the first priority would be Canadian sovereignty. The NATO link would be maintained, but with a much reduced Canadian presence in Europe. Essentially, "... the Trudeau government reached its decision to reduce Canadian forces in Germany because it no longer regarded Europe, as its postwar predecessors all did, as Canada's first line of defence."¹¹

⁸ Ibid., p. 319.

⁹ Ibid., p. 318

¹⁰ Thordarson, Trudeau and Foreign Policy, p. 140.

¹¹ Peter C. Dobell, Canada's Search For New Roles: Foreign Policy In the Trudeau Era (Toronto: Oxford University Press,

Reaction to Reduction

Not surprisingly, the reaction of Canada's NATO allies to the announced reduction was highly critical, particularly so in the case of the British and West Germans. Canada's decision was perceived as a breach of NATO solidarity, and concern was expressed that other members similarly might be encouraged as a result. Comments ranged from highly inadvisable to accusations of passing the buck, and Defence Minister Leo Cadieux's attendance at the NATO Defence Planning Committee in May 1969 must have been anything but a pleasant experience.

... the Europeans [did not] find much comfort in the assurance that Canada recognized the continuing threat to their security, and stood by the NATO pledge to consider an attack against one member as an attack against all. To many of them, the move seemed likely to prejudice what has become one of the primary objectives of NATO, and certainly of Canada, the negotiation of a balanced reduction in the military strength of the two blocs.⁹³

How effective was allied opposition? The Canadian government had apparently been thinking in terms of a two-thirds reduction of the troop commitment in Europe, but in the end it was announced that only half the contingent

⁹²(cont'd) 1972), p. 35.

⁹³Dale C. Thomson and Roger F. Swanson, Canadian Foreign Policy: Options and Perspectives (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1971), p. 54.

would be withdrawn.

... reluctant at the time to say that the government had compromised, the Defence Minister admitted three months later in the House of Commons that, as a result of consultation with our allies, "we had modified considerably our original plan."⁴

Although, according to United States Ambassador Harlan Cleveland, Canada's decision to cut back provoked the toughest talk he had ever witnessed in an international body, the controversy was short-lived. Indeed, by the following year, Canada's influence in NATO had substantially recovered.⁵ But it would be fair to say that some suspicion of Canada's long-term intentions lingered on.

After The Force Reduction

The 1971 White Paper on Defence re-ordered Canada's defence priorities in accordance with Mr. Trudeau's announcement of April 1969. It explained Canada's decision to continue to station troops in Europe as, "a tangible expression of Canadian support for the principle of collective security in the North Atlantic area."⁶ The paper went on to comment that Canadian membership in NATO could be justified solely on security and political grounds, but there was an additional justification which suggested a somewhat different motivation:

⁴Thordarson, Trudeau and Foreign Policy, p. 142.

⁵Peyton V. Lyon, Beyond NATO, International Journal 29 no. 2 (Spring 1974): 272-273.

⁶Canada, White Paper On Defence: Defence In the 70s (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1971), p. 34.

Canada has ... a direct interest in the economic well-being of Western Europe and the preservation of trading relations with this second ranking Canadian market. In connection with the further development and probable enlargement of the European Economic Community (EEC) Canada is engaging in important negotiations with certain of our allies who are current and prospective members of the EEC. The community of interests we share with these countries through common NATO membership should be a positive factor in these negotiations.⁹⁷

Reappraisal Begins

Canada's rehabilitation of its relationship with NATO had begun almost immediately after the announcement of force reductions. The Trudeau government, particularly members of the cabinet, rapidly came to realize that participation in the alliance afforded access and input on major issues in East-West relations, for example Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR).⁹⁸ By 1973, Canada had become among the most ardent supporters of NATO, and the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mitchell Sharp, even commented in a public address that the government's 1969 handling of the NATO question had been less than deft. Following the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Ottawa in 1974, an Atlantic Declaration was released. Two aspects of this

⁹⁷Ibid. (My emphasis)

⁹⁸R.B. Byers, *Defence and Foreign Policy In the 1970s*, International Journal 33 no.2 (Spring 1978): 331.

declaration were particularly significant as a reflection not only of members' perceptions, but also of what was expected of members in terms of commitment:

All members of the Alliance agree that the continued presence of Canadian and substantial U.S. forces in Europe plays an irreplaceable role in the defence of North America as well as Europe. Similarly the substantial forces of the European Allies serve to defend Europe and North America as well

The members of the Alliance consider that the will to combine their efforts to ensure their common defence obliges them to maintain and improve the efficiency of their forces and that each should undertake, according to the role it has assumed in the structure of the Alliance, its proper share of the burden of maintaining the security of all. Conversely, they take the view that in the course of current or future negotiations nothing must be accepted which could diminish this security.'⁹

In 1975, a defence structure review allocated greater importance to Canada's NATO contribution, although there was no official change in defence priorities. Why the turn-around? Political scientist Peyton Lyon suggests that a definite reason was a combination of Mr. Trudeau's belated realization/acknowledgement that relations with Europe were necessary to counter-balance relations with the U.S., and a clear indication from European members of NATO that Canada could not expect to maintain its relations with them without sharing in meeting a security threat which they perceived to be common.¹⁰ Canadian concern for counter-balance to economic relations with the U.S. had certainly been

⁹ Roger Hill, *Political Consultation in NATO*, Wellesley Papers 6/1978 (June 1978): 132-33. (My emphasis)

¹⁰ Lyon, *Beyond NATO*, pp. 274-275.

reinforced by the shock of the Nixon imports surcharge of 1971 and, in addition, Lyon's conjectures are supported by remarks made by Prime Minister Trudeau during a visit to NATO headquarters in Brussels in October 1974. Mr. Trudeau emphasized that membership in NATO allowed Canada to diversify its international relations while strengthening ties with Western Europe. He also alluded to the defence review of 1969, and he made the somewhat startling comment that it had been concluded that by remaining in NATO, Canada had been able to provide for its defence "at the lowest cost."¹⁰¹ Mr. Trudeau next visited the NATO Summit in June 1975 and "[he] made it clear that Canada takes seriously its responsibilities as a good ally and emphasized the importance he attached to Canadian membership in NATO."¹⁰² And in addition,

... the Prime Minister informed the heads of government that his purpose in attending was "to state clearly and unequivocally Canada's belief in the concept of collective security; Canada's support for NATO and Canada's pledge to maintain a NATO force level which is accepted by our allies as being adequate in size and effective in character."¹⁰³

What then had happened to the defence/foreign policy relationship posited in the Trudeau Doctrine? Professor

Byers comments:

¹⁰¹ *Prime Minister Trudeau Visits NATO Headquarters*, NATO Review no. 4 (August 1975): 4. (My emphasis).

¹⁰² James Richardson, *Canada and NATO*, NATO Review no. 4 (August 1975): 4.

¹⁰³ Prime Ministerial Statements and Speeches 75/19 as cited in R.B. Byers, *Defence and foreign policy in the 1970s*, p. 332.

By the late 1970s the major foreign policy-defence interface of the Trudeau Doctrine had been relegated to the bookshelves. An examination of developments in the areas of peacekeeping, the protection of Canada, and NATO shows that the declaratory policy of the government had not been implemented.¹⁰⁴

But what effect did this have on Canadian military participation in NATO? As Byers succinctly observes, "Politically NATO had been rehabilitated, but in terms of defence priorities, spending, and equipment it officially remained of secondary importance."¹⁰⁵ On the subject of defence policy per se, the following comment, made in 1977 concerning the 1971 White Paper on Defence, was and remains pertinent:

... [T]he need for a defence policy that can stand as the basis for long-range planning is still unfulfilled in Canada in spite of the fact that it is required more than ever ... What remains as defence policy is really a loose, uncoordinated and ad hoc response to isolated problems ...¹⁰⁶

Prime Minister Trudeau's new-found enthusiasm for NATO notwithstanding, it would appear that certain member nations viewed Canada's role in NATO as very much a case of a free ride:

A question which bothers Canadians is that of paying their fair share. Canadian social tradition frowns on

¹⁰⁴Byers, *Defence and foreign policy in the 1970s*, p. 321. (My emphasis)

¹⁰⁵Ibid., p. 331. (My emphasis)

¹⁰⁶L. Rosetto, *A Final Look at the 1971 White Paper on Defence, Queen's Quarterly* (1977): PP. 61-62. (My emphasis)

those who get a "free ride." Getting a ride at half-price is more our way of doing things. Having accepted the compact [NATO] we tried to make a respectable contribution.¹⁰⁷

The free ride contention occasioned a major article, by the then Defence Minister, James Richardson, in the August 1975 edition of NATO Review. The theme of Richardson's article was Canada's military contribution to NATO, but he devoted one third of the text to explaining the broad geopolitical considerations which shaped the contribution, "considerations all too often at best inadequately understood in the perspective within which many of our allies view Canada's role in NATO."¹⁰⁸ As to the specifics of the military contribution he commented,

My concern is that, too often, Canada's contribution to NATO is seen only in terms of our forces assigned to Allied Command Europe, and that the important contributions we make through Allied Command Atlantic, to allied security in the North Atlantic and, through the North American Air Defence Command (NORAD) and other arrangements, to allied security in North America receive less recognition in allied bodies and within some allied countries than they deserve.¹⁰⁹

The Trudeau government had good reason to be concerned about the free rider image, as an examination of the general attitude of Canadian governments towards the military will show. Prior to both world wars, Canada's regular military force and reserve forces were small, and both were neglected

¹⁰⁷Holmes, Canada: A Middle-Aged Power, p. 213.

¹⁰⁸Richardson, Canada and NATO, p. 4.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid.

and relatively poorly prepared for any type of operational commitment. In the words of Mr. J.F. Anderson, the current Assistant Deputy Minister (Policy) in the Department of National Defence (DND): "One gets the impression that whenever they perceive that military danger to Canada is receding, Canadian governments hanker for a return to that sort of military posture."¹¹⁰ The Cuban missile crisis of 1962 marked not only a change in the strategic relationship between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, but also had an effect on Canadian defence policy:

[It awakened] in the minds of ... many Canadian ministers a tendency to believe that no matter what Canada did, our fate in the security sense, would be determined by the actions of the United States; a tendency consequently to view Canada's contributions to collective defence whether in North America or elsewhere in NATO, as being, at best, of marginal importance and at worst dispensible, and a tendency in parallel to see the Canadian Forces as a piece of baggage, which perforce had to be carried around in the pursuit of various foreign policy goals, but which for that reason should be kept as light as possible ... The same tendencies have ... been present, to a greater or lesser degree, in virtually every decision on defence or defence-related policies, except perhaps the most recent ones, taken by Canadian governments since 1962.¹¹¹

Reversal

¹¹⁰J.F. Anderson, *Strategy, Policy Formulation, and Military Planning*, Address to the National Defence College: 1976, p. 6.

¹¹¹Ibid., pp. 9-10.

During the 1968/69 Defence Policy Review, the problem was not one of convincing the government that Canada's security interests were aligned with those of other western democracies, of promoting collective security as the best option for Canada's security. "The problem rather was that of getting them to assign any value to Canada's military contribution to the Alliance."¹¹² While successive governments had continued to accept the validity of a strategy of alliance, they had been reticent to accept that Canada's military must be organized and equipped in accordance with this strategy. By 1976 this trend had begun to be reversed, but this would continue,

... only if we [the Department of National Defence] can, through careful and objective strategic study and analysis, help our government to perceive, over the longer term, the potential for future military danger to Canada and its interests, including those it shares with its friends and allies, and if we can, on that basis, put forward well considered foreign and defence policy proposals which demonstrate how, amongst other means, Canadian military capabilities can be used to attenuate those dangers.¹¹³

In late 1975 the first real evidence appeared which indicated that the Trudeau government intended to re-equip the Canadian Forces in order to retain some credible defence posture for the country. It was announced that after fiscal year 1976 the capital expenditure component of the budget would increase, in real terms, by 12 percent per annum for

¹¹²Ibid., p. 12.

¹¹³Ibid., p. 5.

five years.¹¹⁴ It was also apparent that these funds would be devoted to the purchase of equipment directly related to Canada's NATO contribution, for example Orion/Aurora anti-submarine aircraft and Leopard tanks.

[Defence Minister] Barnett Danson informed the Conference of Defence Associations ... 13 January 1977 ... with respect to defence priorities the first three, sovereignty, North American defence and NATO are almost inseparable. We can't have a free North America without a free Western Europe, and Western European cannot be free without a free North America. NATO is a key element. It is our deterrent, our way of letting the Soviets know that we will not allow them easy access to Europe. They must know that we are united, determined and strong.¹¹⁵

Thus, "... the major foreign policy statements which outlined the foreign policy-defence interface of the Trudeau Doctrine had been relegated to the bookshelves."¹¹⁶ Equally important, defence policy objectives were realigned with what was to be a major change in Canadian foreign policy.

In July 1976, Canada signed the Framework Agreement on Economic and Commercial Cooperation with the EEC. This contractual link was a manifestation of the desire to diversify Canada's economic relations, and was a response to the 1971 U.S. imports surcharge referred to earlier. The link was achieved only after considerable personal diplomatic involvement on the part of the Prime Minister, an

¹¹⁴Byers, *Defence and foreign policy in the 1970s*, p. 333.

¹¹⁵Speech to annual meeting of Conference of Defence Associations, 13 January 1977, cited in Byers, *Defence and foreign policy in the 1970s*, p. 334. (My emphasis)

¹¹⁶Ibid., p. 321.

involvement which was necessary to mollify British and German doubts as to the viability of formally including a non-European nation in a European economic framework.¹¹⁷ If the price of this diversification was not immediately apparent, it soon became so. Canadian political scientist Gerald Wright, in a 1978 article for the Canadian Institute of International Affairs, commented that in developing new export markets with the EEC, Canada "has become aware of the linkages that Western European governments perceive between economic and security issues."¹¹⁸ In assessing this new awareness, Wright also observed that:

The Prime Minister may consider that NATO membership no longer acts as an inhibition on Canadian foreign policy and ... the confidence that it [the Canadian government] once manifested in the progress of detente has been seriously eroded and its appreciation of the military balance is now closer to that of its European allies.¹¹⁹

Support for this interpretation can be found in the Department of National Defence annual defence review of 1979, which contended that a nuclear war between the U.S. and USSR remained the greatest threat to Canada's survival. To meet this threat, an effective contribution to the defence of Western Europe and maintenance of the sea lanes, was second only to cooperation with the U.S. in defending

¹¹⁷Dewitt and Kirton, *Canada As A Principal Power*, p. 72.

¹¹⁸Gerald Wright, *NATO In the New International Order*, *Behind the Headlines* 36 no. 4 (April 1978): 16.

¹¹⁹Gerald Wright, *Europe: Policy Planning On A Seesaw*, *International Journal*, no. 2 (Spring 1978): 394.

against a direct attack on North America.¹²⁰ This certainly reflected the perceptions of DND, but Donald Page, writing in Foremost Nation, posits a further rationale for the Trudeau government's renewed interest in NATO:

... [T]he NATO forum has largely replaced the embassies in obtaining information about major diplomatic initiatives and in ensuring Canadian influence in crisis management. While we are kept waiting in the capitals, we are briefed in Brussels. Of increasingly less value is the degree of low cost security provided by NATO though the advantages of technological spin-offs and contracts help balance the budget. A few thousand Canadian hostages in Europe soothe Europe's historical sensitivities while providing a means of gaining favour with the members of the EEC.¹²¹

Given its perceptions of the fringe benefits which NATO affords, is the government likely to endeavour to stimulate further debate on the question of NATO participation? Or, government aside, is there any other source of impetus for such debate? The comments of J.H. Taylor, Deputy Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, in a 1979 presentation to the Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, are noteworthy:

There is no apparent disposition in Canada to renew the [NATO] debate of 10 years ago. What has emerged ... is a national consensus around the following propositions: that Canada should remain a member of the alliance; that Canada should make a respectable

¹²⁰ Canada, Defence: 1979 In Review (Ottawa: Canadian Government Publishing Centre, 1980), p. 7.

¹²¹ Donald Page, Canada and European Detente, A Foremost Nation: Canadian Foreign Policy and a Changing World, Norman Hillmer and Garth Stevenson, ed. (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1977), p. 57. (My emphasis)

military contribution to the direct defence of Europe as well as North America.^{1 2 2}

Taylor concluded his presentation with the following observation:

... unless we wish to abandon our entire postwar history and relapse into isolationism, with all that would entail for our relations both with the United States and with Europe, our political interest in NATO membership remains as powerful as that of any other country of the alliance.^{1 2 3}

Continuing Canadian Participation In NATO

Canadian Perceptions^{1 2 4}

^{1 2 2} J.H.Taylor, *NATO After Thirty Years*, seminar for the Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, Toronto, 1979, p. 5.

^{1 2 3} Ibid., p. 10.

^{1 2 4} More recent Canadian comment on military participation in NATO stems from a variety of sources: A 1980 speech by the then Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mark MacGuigan, to the World Federalists of Canada; a 1981 statement on defence policy by Minister of National Defence, J. Gilles Lamontagne; a March 1981 statement by Lamontagne to the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence - **The 1981-82 Defence Estimates**; a December 1981 address by Mr. MacGuigan to the Ministerial Session of the North Atlantic Council; a January 1982 address by General R. Withers, Canadian Forces Chief of Defence Staff, to the Canadian Defence Association; the January 1982 First Report of the Sub-committee on National Defence of the Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs; and Background Documents on the visit by Prime Minister Trudeau to the North Atlantic Council in Bonn in June 1982.

In his speech to the World Federalists of Canada in June 1980, the then Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mark MacGuigan, observed:

One of the reasons that we can have detente is that we are militarily prepared ... we are sufficiently well prepared, through NATO ... It is in the context of a strong deterrence that I believe we are able still to speak about and hope for detente.^{1 2 5}

Mr. MacGuigan also stated that, "Canada is and will remain a member of NATO. Our security depends on co-operation within that alliance to prevent war."^{1 2 6}

In a 1981 statement, Defence Minister Gilles Lamontagne emphasized Canada's recognition of the need for collective efforts to deter aggression and resist military pressure against the North American and European members of NATO: "It is in this context that, as Minister of National Defence, I have been emphasizing the importance of the re-equipping of our armed forces."^{1 2 7} He went on to comment that there would likely be growing pressure on the resources of the Department of National Defence to meet and maintain NATO commitments in the face of increasing Warsaw Pact military strength in Europe, pressure to acquire up-dated weapons and military systems. The defence policy statement concluded as follows:

^{1 2 5} Mark MacGuigan, Secretary of State for External Affairs, Speech to the World Federalists of Canada, June 1980, p. 2.

^{1 2 6} Ibid., p. 7.

^{1 2 7} Canada, Department of National Defence, Canada and the World in 1981, statement on defence policy by the Honourable J. Gilles Lamontagne, Minister of National Defence, (Ottawa: Canadian Government Publishing Centre, 1981), p. 2.

In this disorderly and dangerous environment it will be important that the Canadian Forces maintain a modern, balanced combat capability to effectively protect [sic] the sovereignty and security of Canada, to meet alliance commitments for collective deterrence and defence and to contribute Canada's fair share towards maintaining international peace.¹²⁸

In a statement contained in **The 1981-82 Defence Estimates**, Lamontagne reiterated his previous contentions, but with an interesting twist:

Hope and good intentions alone ... will not suffice; nor will Canada be in a position to make a contribution and to exert influence on the policies of our allies if we do not at the same time play our fair part in maintaining the Alliance's deterrent and defensive strength while providing for our own security. The government recognizes this [and] the fiscal plan presented to Parliament ... provided for an objective of real growth in the defence budget of 3% annually through 1983/84.¹²⁹

And:

The Speech from the Throne which opened the current Parliament confirmed again the government's commitment to do its fair part in increasing the military capability of the North Atlantic Alliance.¹³⁰

¹²⁸Ibid., p. 9.

¹²⁹Canada, Department of National Defence, The 1981-82 Estimates for the Department of National Defence, statement to the Standing Committee On External Affairs and National Defence by the Honourable Gilles Lamontagne, (Ottawa: Canadian Government Publishing Centre, 1981), p. 10. (My emphasis)

¹³⁰Ibid., p. 8.

In addressing the Ministerial Session of the North Atlantic Council in his capacity as President D'Honneur, Mr. MacGuigan lauded the achievements of the Alliance:

It [NATO] has ... given Europe the largest period of peace it has known in this century. It has also proved its worth as a highly developed forum for political consultations and crisis management. Beyond that, it has fostered growing co-operation in a variety of defence-related fields on the basis of shared interests and values^{1 3 1}

Nor did the NATO spin-offs, as Canada perceived them, go unmentioned:

We can also do more to demonstrate that ours is not just a military alliance - that it is a community of like-minded peoples defending commonly held principles, pursuing common objectives and promoting the widest possible co-operation in the interests of greater stability and welfare.^{1 3 2}

By NATO spin-offs one is referring to the benefits of a non-military nature which participation in the Alliance affords. The potential for political consultation, which already has been alluded to, was initiated by the submission in 1956 of a report on non-military co-operation in NATO. Lester Pearson, then the Minister for External Affairs, was one of the authors. Consultations occur regularly on Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) and Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) negotiations and, in

^{1 3 1} The Honourable Mark MacGuigan, Secretary of State for External Affairs, address to the North Atlantic Council Ministerial Session in his capacity as President d'Honneur, Brussels, December 10, 1981, p. 2.

^{1 3 2} Ibid., p. 4.

addition, there have been a growing number of reinforced council meetings - permanent representatives plus visiting senior officials - to discuss topics ranging from East-West relations to the Middle East and the Law of the Sea.

Canada's interest in enhancing political consultation is readily apparent from its participation in the initial implementation of the process, and from the constant reference made by Canadian officials to the very useful forum which NATO provides for such consultation.^{1 3 3}

The financing of NATO provides additional fringe benefits. While the greater part of the cost of financing NATO is borne by member countries - pay and allowances, equipment, training, logistic support for individual contingents - there are capital, operating and maintenance and support costs which are best dealt with through common financing. The infrastructure programme is the most important of the commonly-financed activities, and its activities have recently broadened from basic construction activities, for example airfields and barracks, to the very sophisticated NATO Integrated Communications System, complete with two satellites. Canadian industry has secured substantial orders as a result of a production sharing agreement, for example the manufacture of NATO small arms ammunition. These benefits will increase in both monetary terms and in terms of access to advanced defence technology as NATO becomes more technology intensive. Representative

^{1 3 3} Information Paper, Canadian Delegation to NATO, January 1976, pp. 2-4.

of the latter is Canadian interest in such projects as Sea-Sparrow, a surface-to-air missile system, and its derivatives, and in advanced electronics research relating to submarine detection. It is also noteworthy that NATO broadly operates on the basis of separate military and civil budgets. The military budget covers the operation of the NATO International Military Headquarters down to Army Group/Allied Tactical Airforce level controlling assigned forces of more than one nation. The civil budget covers NATO Headquarters and such activities as the Science Programme, Information and Cultural Relations Programme, NATO Industrial Advisers Group pre-feasibility studies, and the Challenges of Modern Society Programme. Canada's contributions to the NATO military budget are, not surprisingly, paid by the Department of National Defence, but the civil budget contribution comes out of Department of External Affairs funds.^{1 3 4}

Chief of Defence Staff, General Ramsey Withers, in an address to the Canadian Defence Association, not surprisingly applauded the government's commitment to increase real defence expenditure until 1984. But he added that this same growth would need to continue to 1986-87 just to provide for re-equipping of the current force structure in a reasonable time frame. His comments were remarkably

^{1 3 4}This composite funding arrangement is a practical example of the inseparability of Defence and External Affairs activity in the NATO sphere, and illustrates the degree of policy coordination which occurs between the two departments.

forthright for a serving senior officer:

Funding stability is an imperative for long term planning; and growth is essential both to overcome the deficiencies of years of under-capitalization and to meet the increasing demands of the operational scene.^{1 3 5}

He might have added that nowhere were such concerns more evident than in Canada's NATO endeavours.

The Senate Sub-committee which recently investigated the state of manpower in the Canadian Armed Forces included in its deliberations a discussion of Canadian Forces Europe. A familiar theme re-occurs in the preliminary comments of the Sub-committee's First Report:

Canada embarked on a re-equipment of the armed forces in the mid-1970s partly because it wished to maintain and improve relations with its allies, including trade and other links with Western Europe. Now there are fears that the present re-equipment programmes may be tapered off long before they are completed owing to pressures on federal government finances and doubts in some circles about the usefulness of maintaining substantial military forces.^{1 3 6}

Based upon the evidence presented to it and its own deliberations, the Sub-committee goes on to recommend, among other considerations, an increase in Canadian troop levels in Europe initially to 7800 and subsequently to about 10000, by 1985 and 1987 respectively. This recommendation is based

^{1 3 5}Notes from an address by General R. Withers, Chief of the Defence Staff, Canadian Armed Forces, to the Canadian Defence Association on 14 January 1982. p. 6. (My emphasis)

^{1 3 6}Canada, Senate, First Report, p. 12. (My emphasis)

upon the conclusion that Canada should play its full part in the process of bolstering international stability by transforming Canadian Forces Europe into a more viable military formation:

NATO would be provided with a strong, balanced military formation capable of sustained action, rather than an understrength body which is inadequate for its present role. Allied military commanders would almost certainly not view such a change as a negligible development.¹³⁷

The Sub-committee also pointed out that such a move would go a long way towards off-setting some of the criticism currently being levelled at Canada for spending less than two percent of its GNP on defence and,

[it] would also enhance the perception of Canada's good faith among European allies This could strengthen Canada's hand in pressing for new initiatives on arms control and disarmament, while also yielding benefits in vital negotiations among allied countries on such questions as trade and energy.¹³⁸

The cost of this enhancement is indicated in the accompanying table, but it is an insufficient explanation in itself. An additional \$350 million per annum of defence expenditure in 1981 dollars would amount to approximately 0.1 percent of the present GNP. By adding this sum to the existing commitment to increase the defence budget by three percent per annum, defence spending would increase by only

¹³⁷Ibid., p. 15.

¹³⁸Ibid., p. 16. (My emphasis)

about 0.2 percent of the GNP in this decade, that is from 1.7 to 1.9 percent of the GNP. The Sub-committee concluded that, "... [t]his is a very moderate price to pay for the defence of this country and the fulfilment of its international obligations."¹³⁹

CANADA - SCHEDULE OF ADDITIONAL DEFENCE EXPENDITURES

	Extra Personnel	Personnel Operations and Maintenance Costs	Initial Capital and Similar Costs	Total
		\$Millions	\$Millions	\$Millions
1982/83	-	-	100	100
1983/84	-	-	350	350
1984/85	-	-	350	350
1985/86	2,400	100	250	350
1986/87	2,400	100	250	350
1987/88	8,400	350	-	350
1988/89	8,400	350	-	350
1989/90	8,400	350	-	350
1990/91	8,400	350	-	350

Source: First Report of the Sub-committee on National Defence of the Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs: "Manpower in Canada's Armed Forces," January 1982, p. 44. Expenditures are in millions of 1981 dollars.

Further Canadian government comment on participation in NATO occurred during Prime Minister Trudeau's visit to Bonn

¹³⁹Canada, Senate, First Report, p. 45.

in June of 1982. One of the key questions addressed in the background documents to the visit was whether or not Canada should continue as a member of NATO. And the response:

Two world wars have taught Canada that it cannot remain aloof from developments in Europe ... the defence of that continent is the first line of defence for Canada ... As so much of Canada's national income is derived from foreign trade - 80 to 90% with our partners in NATO - we are interested in open trade routes and a stable world.¹⁴⁰

In summation, "NATO is needed. Canada needs NATO as NATO needs Canada ... as it did more than 30 years ago and as it will for a considerable time to come."¹⁴¹

European Perceptions

What of the perceptions of other NATO allies of Canada's military participation in the Alliance? Nils Orvik, the Director of the Centre for International Relations at Queen's University, comments:

It is well known that the American government believes, as do most other NATO allies, that Canada does not pull its weight in the alliance. With our gross national product, our relatively large population and abundant natural resources, they think we could do better than less than two percent of the GNP which has been our average allocation to defence for the past few years.¹⁴²

¹⁴⁰Ibid., p. 10.

¹⁴¹Ibid.

¹⁴²Nils Orvik, *Choices and Directions In Canadian Defence Policy Part 2: A New Defence Posture With A Northern Orientation*, Canadian Defence Quarterly, 10 no. 1 (Summer 1980): 11-12.

The observations of Rolf Braband, a German and Director of Force Planning for NATO, and Robert Held of *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* provide a West German perspective. Braband observed, "We must keep pushing Canada forward ... your country has a reputation for putting things off."¹⁴³ Held contends that the effect of Prime Minister Trudeau's aversion to militarism on Canadian foreign policy should not be forgotten, and that it was easy for Trudeau to hold back on defence decisions because many Canadians shared his opinion. Alluding to what he sees as a Canadian predilection for isolationism and the down-playing of defence considerations, Held comments:

The vastness of the country [Canada] and its potential riches for future generations probably demands greater than normal military preparedness and special sacrifices. But the Prime Minister seems to have difficulty explaining such things to the Canadian people, though he is willing to acknowledge the value of NATO in his international appearances and this contradicts the touch of snobbish neutralism which the young Trudeau had about him.¹⁴⁴

Held also provides an interesting comment on what he sees as bureaucratic linkages:

Nor should it be forgotten that because of Canada's geostrategic position, and its participation in the

¹⁴³Alex Nickerson, *Great praise for Canada's NATO forces*, *Halifax Chronicle Herald*, 13 May 1976, p. 23, as cited in Larry R. Stewart, *Canada's European Force 1971 - 1980: A Defence Policy In Transition* (Kingston, Ont.: Queen's University Centre for International Relations, National Security Series No. 5/80, 1980), p. 103.

¹⁴⁴Robert Held, *Canadian Foreign Policy: An Outsider's View*, *International Journal* 33 no. 2 (Spring 1978): 455.

defence of Europe ... the Department of National Defence is closely linked to the conduct of foreign policy - indeed the planners in the two departments [Defence and External Affairs] interact continually. Certainly the opinions and wishes of the Department of Defence play an increasing role in relations with the Federal Republic of Germany.¹⁴⁵

In an interview contained in the Summer 1980 edition of Canadian Defence Quarterly, Air Chief Marshall Sir David Evans assessed, in his capacity as a NATO Air Commander, Canada's future role in the Alliance:

... the contribution that Canada has to make to the Alliance is unique, not only because it is North American-orientated and provides a "bridge" across the Atlantic, but also because the individual capabilities that Canadians possess are very considerable [T]he larger the numerical contribution Canada decides to make in the future the better; it will be welcomed by NATO, and the Alliance as a whole will benefit accordingly.¹⁴⁶

Peter C. Newman, when editor of Macleans, observed in a 15 February 1982 article entitled Is World War III inevitable? that "Every NATO commander since Ike Eisenhower has praised the quality of Canadian troops, but the size of our commitment has become a laughingstock."¹⁴⁷ In a similar vein, one finds the headlines, *NATO wants Canadian troops*, in an Edmonton Journal article of 24 February of 1982:

¹⁴⁵Held, *Canadian Foreign Policy: An Outsider's View*, p. 452. (My emphasis).

¹⁴⁶Lieutenant Colonel G.R. King, *Air Power, The Security of the N.A.T.O. Area, and the Defence of the United Kingdom*, interview with Air Chief Marshall Sir David Evans, Canadian Defence Quarterly 10 no. 1 (Summer 1980): 26.

¹⁴⁷Peter C. Newman, *Is World War III inevitable?*, Macleans, 15 February 1982, p. 35.

U.S. Gen. Bernard Rogers, supreme allied commander in Europe, told an Ottawa news conference Tuesday that he had asked Defence Minister Gilles Lamontagne to boost the size of the Canadian group in central Europe U.S. Admiral Harry Train, supreme allied commander Atlantic, said he would be grateful if the new frigate program, "which has been debated so long, would finally materialize and result in newer and more capable ships." He said Canada's navy is hampered by aging vessels and NATO is counting on the new frigates being delivered as soon as possible to strengthen Canada's important anti-submarine role.¹⁴⁸

What of Eastern European perceptions of Canadian participation in NATO? John Holmes comments that while one might suppose that Eastern Europeans would accord Canada more respect if it were neutral, "there is also evidence that they would rather have us as a member of the NATO team, involved thereby in a European security conference and NATO-Warsaw Pact bargaining because of our reputation for flexibility."¹⁴⁹

C. Corporate Planning - The Canadian Experience

Overview

As Justice Minister during the twilight years of the Pearson administration, Mr. Trudeau had been unimpressed with the segmented and incremental approach which characterized governmental activity. Coordination under this system had

¹⁴⁸ *NATO wants Canadian troops*, Edmonton Journal, 24 February 1982, p. A5.

¹⁴⁹ Holmes, Canada: A Middle-Aged Power, p. 217.

been left to indirect processes such as informal contacts within a small permanent bureaucracy, and the ability of elected leaders to respond swiftly to crises. This arrangement was viewed by Trudeau and his advisers as being totally incapable of dealing with the complexities of modern government. It not only ignored basic standards of comprehensive searching, competing advice, trade-offs and preplanning, but also it seemed merely to perpetuate existing policy by protecting the advice of department experts from the broader concerns of the corporate whole.

The issue of the increasing complexity of government notwithstanding, it would be fair to say that much of the impetus for reform stemmed from the personal philosophy of Trudeau. "This philosophy stressed clear definitions of goals, systematic analysis of policy options, the monitoring of the progress of programs and an anticipation of societal trends - in short, rational and comprehensive planning."¹⁵⁰ These rationalistic aspirations were shared by Trudeau's advisory staff. However, as Bruce Doern rightly contends, it would be a mistake to attribute the rationalistic tendencies of the period wholly to Trudeau and his advisers, for such tendencies were in fact a reflection of a more widely held concern about the welfare state apparatus, a preoccupation of Western government and politics since the 1930s.¹⁵¹ There was a particular concern over

¹⁵⁰Adie and Thomas, Canadian Public Administration: Problematical Perspectives, p. 106. (My emphasis)

¹⁵¹Doern, *Recent Changes in the Philosophy of policy-making in Canada*, p. 247.

ever-increasing and uncontrolled costs built into government programs of the mid-Sixties, because it was clear that resources for new programs to meet new priorities would not be available, unless lower program priorities received fewer resources or were cancelled. An awareness of these factors pre-dated the Trudeau years, as did a realization that segmented and de-centralized policy planning was not going to provide a solution. The place of the Trudeau philosophy is aptly described by Doern:

The importance of the Trudeau philosophy is that his own views and that of many of his senior advisers gave intellectual support and reinforcement to the needs imposed by these broader policy realities. His philosophy was, and is, therefore, an important variable.^{1 5 2}

Little time was wasted in putting into practice the reforms which the Prime Minister and closest advisers felt were necessary, a process which brought about the creation of new bureaucratic organizations to supplant monopolies of older departments, and the creation of task forces and interdepartmental committees to link executive and bureaucratic decision-making.^{1 5 3} In the context of foreign policy, the segmented governmental processes of the past were replaced with an informal set of ten broadly based inter-departmental systems: a single system for economic affairs, seven smaller systems for energy, communications, transport, science, environment, defence, and immigration,

^{1 5 2} Ibid.

^{1 5 3} Campbell and Szablowski, The Superbureaucrats, p. 80.

and the two highly political systems of public diplomacy and diplomatic affairs.¹⁵⁴ This concept envisaged a wider, more vigorous interdepartmental scrutiny of matters pertinent to policy formulation, a process which would be followed by policy-making activity at the cabinet and central agency levels.

The restructuring and development of a planning capacity in the Prime Minister's Office (PMO) and Privy Council Office (PCO) was symptomatic of the attachment of Prime Minister Trudeau and his advisers to a more rational, coordinated approach to policy making. The PCO, with a larger staff and more diversified organization than the PMO, therefore possessed a much greater analytic capability, and not surprisingly it became the focal point for strategic planning. At the time of the structural reforms in 1969, the head of the PCO was Gordon Robertson, but it was under his successor that the PCO's policy planning and advisory function reached its peak. Robertson was succeeded in 1975 by Michael Pitfield, a consummate bureaucrat who had come up through the Ottawa system and knew the ropes. This was "... a move that placed in the most senior post in the civil service an individual much closer to the Prime Minister in intellectual perspective, decision-making style and personal rapport."¹⁵⁵ Indeed, Pitfield had been an acquaintance of Mr. Trudeau for some time prior to the latter's election.

¹⁵⁴John J. Kirton, *Foreign policy decision-making in the Trudeau government: promise and performance*, International Journal 23 no. 2 (Spring 1978): 293.

¹⁵⁵Dewitt and Kirton, Canada As A Principal Power, p. 221.

With Pitfield in charge, the PCO, not surprisingly, exercised considerable influence in providing policy advice to the Prime Minister.

One of Pitfield's first tasks on being appointed Clerk of the Privy Council was to chair a review of defence structure. The review had been stimulated by a combination of disagreement within government over defence priorities as stated in the 1971 White Paper, and the realization that the Canadian Armed Forces were both overtasked and under-funded to meet their commitments. Primary responsibility for conducting the review rested with DND, but External Affairs contributed an overview of the international situation. And before the work was submitted to Cabinet, it was reviewed by a committee of senior officials - including the Deputy Minister of External Affairs, Secretary of the Treasury Board, and representatives from the Department of Industry, Trade and Commerce, and Department of Supply and Services - chaired by Pitfield. Essentially, the review confirmed the commitments of the Forces as specified in the White Paper. Thus it committed the government to the allocation of funds for much needed capital equipment purchases and, more importantly in the context of NATO, it enhanced the importance of Canada's NATO role - albeit without changing the 1971 priorities.¹⁵⁶ This dichotomy was solved, at least rhetorically, by simply stating that the first three defence priorities were synonymous.¹⁵⁷

¹⁵⁶ Stewart, Canada's European Force: 1971-1980, pp. 69-70.

¹⁵⁷ See Chapter Two comments made by Barnett Danson when

The choice of Pitfield to chair the defence review seems, with the benefit of hindsight, an obvious one. Pitfield was acutely aware of the realities of the political content of the policy-making process, for as one PCO official noted:

Pitfield is ambivalent about the dichotomy between politics and bureaucracy. Certainly, he is less cut and dried than Robertson [his predecessor] who stayed out of political matters. Pitfield tends to get involved^{1 5 8}

It is perhaps not inaccurate to observe that Robertson and Pitfield represented bureaucratic extremes, the former inclined towards under-involvement in terms of politically oriented policy advice, and the latter inclined towards over-involvement in a superbureaucratic context. By late 1974, the Trudeau government had begun to realize that there was little economic benefit to be had from pursuing sovereignty as a defence priority, particularly at a time when the Third Option required the sort of highly visible support that would appeal to Western Europeans. However, there was still the political issue of defence priorities to be considered. Cabinet had been virtually split on the defence priorities debate in 1969, and Trudeau would obviously have been reluctant to either raise the spectre of a similar split or, and perhaps a more important consideration, officially to reverse the policy focus which

^{1 5 7} (cont'd) Minister of National Defence.

^{1 5 8} Campbell and Szablowski, The Superbureaucrats, p. 74.

he had used to sell his comprehensive foreign policy review in 1969. What better choice than Pitfield to provide a solution? Close to the Prime Minister and well aware of Cabinet predilections, he orchestrated a defence review which produced no official changes to priorities, but which molded defence policy to the extent that was required to address the issue of the moment, evidence of the importance which Canada attached to its NATO contribution.

It would be reasonable to hypothesize that while DND must have been satisfied with the government commitment to increase defence expenditure, Pitfield's role in the review was less well received. The political involvement of Pitfield and his PCO staff, and their meddling in departmental affairs, were the cause of adverse reaction if not outright hostility towards the PCO on the part of departments generally. The PCO was by no means averse to moving from a prodding approach to one of pulling rank - apprising the Prime Minister of a problem and recommending a solution. In the words of a PCO official interviewed by Campbell and Szablowski, "If a minister and his officials are dragging their feet on something that is dear to the PM's heart, we might try to get a letter out of him to the minister saying, in effect, **get off your ass.**"¹⁵⁹ This attitude must have been of considerable concern to DND, a department which had been relegated to a very minor role since 1969, and which had been headed by a succession of

¹⁵⁹Ibid., p. 81.

ministers who suffered a similar status in the Cabinet hierarchy. Nor were these concerns groundless:

Prime Ministerial [and therefore PCO] prominence ... had its impact ... particularly within the sensitive and costly sphere of defence. James Richardson [Minister of National Defence] failed to secure an indefinite extension of NORAD and the closing of unneeded military bases, although he did obtain from Cabinet acceptance of the 1975 defence structure review and accompanying authorization of a major re-equipment program [predictably, in light of the preceding discussion]. Similarly, his successor, Barnett Danson, was overruled by Cabinet when he opposed Canadian participation in UNIFIL [United Nations Interim Force In Lebanon] in 1978.¹⁶⁰

Interdepartmental Committee on External Relations

In 1970, in an effort to achieve maximum integration of its foreign operations, the government established the Interdepartmental Committee on External Relations (ICER). This committee was set up at the deputy-minister level, and it was chaired by the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs. Its responsibilities included advice to government on areas concerned with management of foreign operations, such as "... harmonization of plans and programs, the allocation of resources, [and] the implementation of foreign operations and policies for the management of personnel."¹⁶¹

¹⁶⁰Dewitt and Kirton, Canada As A Principal Power, pp. 221-22. (It should be noted that peacekeeping is still, officially, the lowest priority, and one for which DND has evinced little enthusiasm given the other demands on its resources.)

¹⁶¹J.R. Maybee, An Approach to Integration Through ICER, International Perspectives (September-October 1972): 40-3.

The policy coordination efforts of the ICER were hampered by several considerations. First, policies and programs pursued by one department can have marked side effects on the efforts of other departments, and the control of these side effects is something for which each department must formulate its own method. Second, each department addresses a problem in the context of the policies it is charged with promoting, and these policies do not necessarily make allowances for those of other departments. Third, in situations where several large departments must coordinate their approaches, the traditional, informal modes of consultation with which these departments are accustomed to operating may simply not be sufficient to provide for rapidly changing circumstances. Fourth and last, easy international communications have made it easy for departments to initiate their own overseas contacts, and thereby to avoid resorting to a coordinative body.¹⁶²

However, the major problem area in terms of policy coordination was one of definition. Policy and related terms such as aims, goals, objectives, programs and projects held different meanings for different departments. Not only did this call for standardization of definition, but also for systematic and regulated procedures in terms of both policy formulation and implementation in governmental decision-making. Moreover, there was a concern that policy implementation be based upon "...a comprehensive

¹⁶²Ibid., p. 42.

appreciation of the interplay of different national objectives ... to enable officials to perceive the programs they are implementing as parts of a coherent whole."¹⁶³

It had originally been envisaged that the ICER and related coordinative activity, such as the 1969 task force initiated by officials in the central agencies to examine the question of a coordinative mechanism, would lead to a foreign affairs program controlled by a central superministry.¹⁶⁴ But departmental opposition thwarted the establishment of such a ministry and, in the absence of this instrument of central control and with the re-direction of government attention to such pressing issues as the economy, incrementalism caught up with the integration process. An important result was that External Affairs gradually took the initiative in orchestrating interdepartmental foreign affairs activity.¹⁶⁵ This was to the advantage of both External Affairs and other departments with like interests in the foreign affairs sphere, such as DND with whom

¹⁶³Ibid., p. 43.

¹⁶⁴Byers, *Defence and Foreign Policy In the 1970s*, pp. 303-04.

¹⁶⁵Ibid., p. 304.

External shared a concern for Canada's commitment to NATO.

Policy Planning and Research Units

Still another manifestation of the Trudeau government's organizational changes was the establishment of policy units at the departmental level. This stemmed partly from the government's desire to force the bureaucracy to fulfill its responsibility to provide policy, and partly from a PCO perception that there was a need to improve the quality of departmental submissions in order to make the central planning and decision-making process in and around Cabinet function more efficiently. In an approach akin to that envisaged for the central agencies, departmental units were intended to be high profile, and it was anticipated that they would be involved in direct exchanges, in both an intradepartmental and interdepartmental sense. The form and focus of the planning units should not be surprising, given that they were created at a time when an application of greater rationality - "... greater efficiency and effectiveness, clearer objectives and thus stronger political direction ..." ¹⁶⁶ - was held to be the panacea for the increasing complexity of governmental activity and bureaucratic politics. "Solutions existed for all problems if only adequate structures and processes were in place to

¹⁶⁶Michael J. Prince and John A. Chenier, *The rise and fall of policy planning and research units: an organizational perspective*, Canadian Public Administration 23 no. 4 (Winter 1980): 530.

anticipate, to plan, and to coordinate government activity."¹⁶⁷ In the context of foreign policy formulation, the departmental units would provide the necessary link between the ten systems and the relevant central planning agency - the PCO. However, departmental policy units were also a response to what was perceived as a threat to departmental interests from central agencies - notably the PCO. "Indeed, planning units in departments were often created to protect and advance ministerial and departmental interests in the executive and central bureaucratic area."¹⁶⁸ It is interesting to note that a Policy Branch and an Evaluation Branch at the Assistant Deputy Minister level were established by DND in 1972.¹⁶⁹

As Prince and Chenier point out in their assessment of departmental planning and research units from an organizational perspective such units were for the most part unsuccessful. Two of the most important reasons for their failure were lack of credibility - some units were not seen to play a viable role in departmental activity - and lack of commitment from senior departmental officials. Perhaps because they were part of a low-profile department, the DND units have been more successful, although not in the context of central policy planning. Defence issues were, for reasons discussed earlier, unlikely to attract other than the transitory attention of the PCO, with the result that

¹⁶⁷Ibid., p. 531.

¹⁶⁸Ibid., p. 527.

¹⁶⁹Ibid., p. 528.

DND activity tended to focus on cooperation with other departments where a commonality of interest was perceived. This was not what the Trudeau government had envisaged when the ten broad systems were created which were, with the help of planning and research units, to channel policy advice to the central agencies for subsequent concentrated policy-making at the Cabinet level.

In environment and defence a rather different process developed. Here the traditional involvement of External Affairs in boundary waters and peace and security matters tended to give that department a strong role in many contemporary environmental and military affairs. Thus the relevant units of External Affairs forged a close, co-operative relationship with their more active or more numerous counterparts in Environment and National Defence and there emerged a genuinely collective process of policy-making, usually centred at the senior official level.¹⁷⁰

Thus it would seem that the planning and research units in DND (Policy Branch and Evaluations Branch) definitely played a viable role in departmental activity, and were well supported by the department. At the same time, they contributed little to, and indeed undermined, the efforts of the Trudeau government to centralize policy-making.

¹⁷⁰Kirton, *Foreign policy decision-making in the Trudeau government: promise and performance*, p. 295. (My emphasis)

IV. Analysis

A. Introduction

It is pertinent first to consider the applicability or relevance which the theoretical considerations assessed in Chapter One have for Canadian governmental activity and, specifically, for Canadian military participation in NATO. It will be remembered that the Trudeau government's predilection for a more rational approach to governmental activity led to changes in theoretical approach. Rather than being perceived as perhaps a necessary result of the increasing complexity of government activity, incrementalism was held to be unacceptable and correctable. The solution to incrementalism was seen to be a comprehensive rational approach to decision-making. In the context of Canadian defence policy, which was perceived as being unduly influential in foreign policy formulation, the government contended that defence policy and its focus on NATO activity was an anachronism which epitomized the cumulative problem which incremental change had created; a problem reinforced by the incrementalist approach to policy decision-making applied by previous governments.

It was assumed by the Trudeau government that the Department of National Defence (DND), and for that matter any other department, would adjust its priorities as directed and departmental routines or SOPs, to the extent that they were important, would undergo a corresponding

change. The importance which Mr. Trudeau attached to changing the bureaucracy, specifically bureaucratic methods, would seem sufficient justification for including organizational process as a further instrument of theoretical analysis by which the effects of the Trudeau government's reforms may be assessed.

It would also seem reasonable to hypothesize that some form of bureaucratic politics exists in the Canadian governmental process. What then of the relevance of the Allison model as a theoretical basis for analysis? In an article titled, **Bureaucratic Politics in Canadian Government**, Kim Richard Nossal supports the applicability of the model.¹⁷¹ Nossal contends, "... that six features of the policy-making system in Canada make the bureaucratic politics approach both useful and applicable in the Canadian context."¹⁷² Additional support for the applicability of this approach is to be found in the work of Simon McInnes and Richard J. Schultz.¹⁷³ The relevance of Allison's bureaucratic politics model to a Canadian scenario, not forgetting that one must be cognizant of the model's limitations as discussed earlier, would thus seem reasonable.

¹⁷¹Kim Richard Nossal, *Bureaucratic Politics in Canadian Government*, in Kenneth Kernaghan, ed. Public Administration in Canada(Toronto: Methuen, 1982.

¹⁷²Ibid., p. 271-74.

¹⁷³Simon McInnes, *Crisis Management and Bureaucratic Politics in Canada* Richard J. Schultz, *Prime Ministerial Government*, as cited in Nossal, *Bureaucratic Politics in Canadian Government*, p. 270.

The changes implemented by the Trudeau government involved not only a change in the theoretical approach to decision-making and policy planning, but also structural changes in government organization. Comprehensive rationality was seen to be the solution to incremental decision-making. Corporate planning and cybernetic techniques, which were perceived not as an entirely different approach but rather as an adjunct to comprehensive rationality, were the means by which policy priorities could be re-ordered, and a coordinated corporate departmental input achieved. The structural changes which accompanied corporate planning as the Trudeau government perceived it were to have important consequences for departmental/bureaucratic activity.

What can be said of the Trudeau government's perceptions and methodological preferences? The answer to this question will not only provide useful insight into the realities of decision-making in a general conceptual sense, but will also serve to confirm or confound the hypothesis that neither of the two dominant approaches to decision-making address the process of incremental change, and that organizational processes and bureaucratic politics are important factors in policy planning and decision-making. More specifically, it will help to explain the direction which Canadian military participation in NATO has taken as a consequence of the government's theoretical assumptions. The first part of this chapter addresses the

question of the accuracy of the government's assumptions in light of the assessment of theoretical considerations which concludes Chapter One. The second part deals with the specifics of Canada's NATO participation.

B. The Realities of Decision-Making

The Demise of Comprehensive Rationality

The predilection of Mr. Trudeau and his advisers for a comprehensive rational approach to decision-making led to no little frustration when the anticipated results were not forthcoming. The problem was that in attempting to deal with the complexities of governmental activity, a rationalization of the decision-making process and thereby a focus on the means of dealing with the complexity became a fixation. The Trudeau government became a victim of the very inertia it had set out to correct because a comprehensive rational approach does not address the objectives or ends of policy decision-making, and thus it simply perpetuates incremental change. This would seem to support empirically the conceptual consideration that through a misperception of what is in the context of the social world, a misperception of what can be done results. It will be remembered that the comprehensive rational approach is costly in terms of both the time and the information required to support it. To enhance the information gathering process the government interposed a

superbureaucratic entity - the PCO, about which more will be said in due course - between itself and the existing bureaucratic structure. This organization, closely attuned to the wants of the Prime Minister, was encouraged to play politics in the course of its policy coordinating activity. In so doing it undermined rather than enhanced any efforts aimed at comprehensive rational planning and decision-making, because it antagonized the departments upon whom it depended for information.

In relatively short order, the Trudeau government was forced by pressures of circumstance and time into dealing with policy planning and decision-making at best in the very manner which it had sought to avoid - incrementally - and at worst ad hoc. The intellectual gymnastics with which this was accomplished, without an official change of approach, is exemplified by the following admission by the Honourable C.M. Drury when secretary of the Treasury Board:

[I]t must be recognized that incrementalism remains a central element in the decision-making process. This is how a large proportion of public policy decisions are and must be made, given the scale of government and given the very nature of social change. It is a matter of integrating and harmonizing the PPBS [Planning, Programming and Budgeting System - a good example of comprehensive rational planning] approach with this more traditional approach to decision-making.¹⁷⁴

This was particularly the case in the economic sphere, where

¹⁷⁴The Honourable C.M. Drury, News Release on the Tabling of the 1970-71 Estimates (n.d.) as cited in Doern, *Recent Changes in the Philosophy of Policy-making in Canada*, p. 260.

rapidly changing circumstances on a global scale - a foretaste of the current recession - had undermined any attempts at long-range planning, and in the domestic sphere in the context of national unity - epitomized by the Quebec problem. The government had been dazzled by the prospects of applying a scientific/positivist approach to policy planning and decision-making, claiming to be "... wide awake, alert to the prospects which cybernetic techniques had to offer."¹⁷⁵ But instead of creating a learning how to learn environment in the true cybernetic sense, government activities became mired, as Doern aptly describes it, in a process of getting ready to get ready.¹⁷⁶ The government was forced to acknowledge the realities of incremental change. This was exemplified in foreign and defence policy by the incremental, perhaps more correctly ad hoc, decisional processes which operationalized the government's renewed interest in NATO. But the idea persisted that if not comprehensive rationality at least a blend of rationality and the more traditional, incrementalist approach to decision-making could be achieved. This simply reinforced an approach which was totally means oriented and the result, in the context of defence policy, was that there was no further adjustment of the goals/priorities which had been fundamentally changed after the 1969 review. The government purported to continue to subscribe to these priorities and even amalgamated them, at least rhetorically, but the

¹⁷⁵Ibid., p. 248.

¹⁷⁶Ibid., p. 259.

specifics or adjustments required to meet the ongoing material requirements of defence in light of the stated priorities were addressed in an ad hoc fashion, and at best with a minimum allocation of resources. Defence policy was thus a means, but one which merely addressed broader policy considerations which were in themselves reduced to means by incremental change and the approach to decision-making which the government chose to adopt.

By setting general if not vague policy parameters in areas which it initially perceived as relatively unimportant, such as defence, and simply expecting departments to get on with it, the Trudeau government in effect abrogated its responsibility for the infusion of politically oriented value judgments into the decision-making process in both the political and bureaucratic sectors. This abrogation was exacerbated by the fact that central agencies - superbureaucracies - were allowed, both by accident and design, to exercise the prerogative of the political sector; to apply value judgments in their coordinative activities. It might not be surprising to find that departmental decision-making and policy advice came to reflect organizational values, and this is a consideration which will be more specifically addressed in the second part of this chapter.

The Influence of Organizational Process and Bureaucratic Politics

What of the government's relationship with the bureaucracy? Mr. Trudeau's disdain for bureaucrats and the inertia of bureaucratic activity are well documented facts. Indeed, he had been heard to comment that if he could not control the bureaucracy, he had no interest in being Prime Minister.¹⁷⁷

In determining whether or not the Canadian bureaucracy was susceptible to change, one must consider the influence of organizational process and bureaucratic politics. As has been mentioned, the sheer volume of governmental activity calls for the factoring of problems or fractionating of power, a process which even the Trudeau government with its predilection for coordination and centralized control could not avoid. The price of this fractionating was the discretion which departments had to be allowed in dealing with particular problem areas - given that even with central planning agencies, the government simply could not thoroughly monitor policy outcomes or implementation. Was organizational parochialism a problem? Given the Prime Minister's inherent suspicion of bureaucratic activity, it is reasonable to assume that such parochialism was anticipated by Mr. Trudeau and his advisers. When he felt moved to do so, Mr. Trudeau was quick to suppress such activity, as is exemplified by DND policy advice and related

¹⁷⁷Adie and Thomas, Canadian Public Administration: Problematical Perspectives, p. 177.

requests for equipment which he was wont to dismiss as the posturing of cold warriors.¹⁷⁸ The Prime Minister seemed overly ready to regard organizational parochialism as simply another bureaucratic nuisance, rather than to give any consideration to the possibility that there might be some validity to the issues raised, or that his cavalier treatment of these issues might well be reinforcing the negative side of departmental parochialism and, thereby, departments' reluctance to change.

Mr. Trudeau was also well aware that departmental activity revolved around routines or SOPs, and he probably blamed these for what he perceived as bureaucratic inertia with respect to policy advice and implementation. The solution to altering these programmed responses to deal with the new approach to planning and decision-making which the government wished to instill was held to be structural/organizational change and the installation of an organizational leadership more in tune with the Prime Minister's requirements. The issue of structural change will be dealt with in due course, but first the question of what might best be described as a more malleable departmental leadership. While it might be overstating the case to contend that Mr. Trudeau preferred sycophants, as one might successfully argue in the case of the PCO, it would not be inaccurate to say that he preferred Cabinet ministers who were like thinkers and who would ensure that

¹⁷⁸ Stewart, Canada's European Force: 1971-1980, p. 68.

their departments would not rock the corporate boat. Again, DND provides a particularly good example of how the departmental leadership game was played. When Mr. Trudeau took office as Prime Minister, Leo Cadieux, who had been Minister of National Defence in the Pearson government, was retained in that position. Conversely, Paul Martin, who had been Pearson's Secretary of State for External Affairs and who remained in the Trudeau Cabinet, was not offered his old portfolio.¹⁷⁹ The reason for this was that Cadieux was not perceived as a threat to Trudeau's authority.¹⁸⁰ However, Martin, who was clearly an influential member of the old guard in a Pearsonian sense, was neither in tune with Trudeau's views nor was he inclined to change.¹⁸¹ Paul Martin, not surprisingly, did not remain in the Trudeau Cabinet for long; what is interesting is that neither did Leo Cadieux. The latter was one of the then senior dissenting voices when the Prime Minister implemented the review of Canada's NATO policy. Mr. Trudeau was even less disposed to listen to dissenting voices in Cabinet than he was to accept the series of reviews which contended that no policy change was required. He solved the review problem by having Ivan Head produce an independent paper which provided recommendations more in keeping with what the Prime Minister and his advisers deemed acceptable.¹⁸² This compromise solution, a partial reduction of the Canadian NATO force

¹⁷⁹Thordarson, Trudeau and Foreign Policy, p. 45.

¹⁸⁰Ibid., p. 90.

¹⁸¹Ibid., pp. 114-15.

¹⁸²Ibid., pp. 137 and 158.

stationed in Europe, produced sufficient Cabinet support to gain acceptance, but it could hardly have appealed to Cadieux and would seem to reflect the use of the corporate approach to justify and give validity to preconceived opinions. In addition, the Defence Minister was given the thankless task of explaining the force reductions to Canada's NATO allies. This was very much his swan song, and he was followed by a succession of relatively junior and certainly less influential ministers, who were quickly discouraged if they showed any signs of attempting to raise the Defence portfolio above the insignificant level to which it had been relegated.¹⁸³ On the important issue of a review of defence priorities, Donald MacDonald - who had argued for a total withdrawal of Canadian troops from Europe - was brought in as Defence Minister long enough to produce the 1971 White Paper. It might be said that the most remarkable aspect of this document was its lack of clear policy directives, exemplified by the nebulous, protection of sovereignty.

Mention of the White Paper brings one to a consideration of the effect of long-range plans on organizational routines. The organizational process model posits that where an organization is confronted with goals which are equally demanding on limited resources, there is a tendency to proceed with these goals one at a time, to the virtual neglect of some of them. In the case of DND and the

¹⁸³In support of this contention see Dewitt and Kirton, Canada As a Principal Power, pp. 221-22.

White Paper, the fundamental problem was one of definition. For example, in the context of the first priority or goal, protection of Canadian sovereignty, what was the real requirement? Was comprehensive protection required? If so, a substantial injection of resources would be necessary to enable the department to carry out this task. One has only to picture the extent of Canada's coastline to envisage the mammoth scope of such an undertaking and, in any event, DND can have had few illusions as to the government's willingness to increase substantially defence spending. It must also be remembered that the department had to address, in some measure, the second, third and fourth defence priorities, all of which were at least manpower if not capital intensive. How these apparently conflicting priorities were dealt with over time will be discussed in the second part of this chapter. At this stage it is sufficient to note that in the period immediately after the defence review considerable time was spent on formulation of plans which attempted to spread thin resources over a multiplicity of tasks, and on a fruitless search for equipment with multi-role capabilities.

The Trudeau government might have done well to have considered one of Graham Allison's observations concerning the organizational process: "... each organization will do its part in terms of what the organization knows how to do."¹⁸⁴ DND did not know how to continue to operate

¹⁸⁴Allison, Essence of Decision, pp. 93-94.

effectively - to do its part - with the priorities and resources it had been given. But then, there is some doubt as to whether or not the government perceived DND to have a part to play, except in a very peripheral sense. In time the government would find it convenient to suggest otherwise, but as events were to illustrate, this was a position in which the Trudeau government was neither comfortable nor credible. What of the influence of bureaucratic politics? That it was and is an influence in Canadian governmental activity is well-supported by the work of Nossal, McInnes and Schultz. Nor was the importance of bureaucratic politics lost on Mr. Trudeau and his advisers. However, it would appear that the government over-estimated the control it could exert over bureaucratic activity in relation to policy formulation and policy results, and nowhere was this more apparent than in the area of bureaucratic politics. With respect to the planning and formulation of foreign policy, it obviously was felt that the creation of the ten broad systems mentioned earlier, which would channel decision-making activity through to the PCO and thence to Cabinet for centralized control and consideration, would ensure that bureaucratic political influence did not extend beyond the level of the individual departments. This approach could be considered somewhat analogous to the procedure suggested in Alex George's multiple advocacy model, in that it purported to orchestrate bureaucratic activity/inputs while at the same time properly

reserving the decision-making function in the area of policy for the central authority. However, as mentioned earlier, only in four of the ten systems was centralization of decision-making activity achieved. John Kirton's comments on the approach are noteworthy for their acknowledgement of the influence of bureaucratic politics: "Its effectiveness was in the first instance restricted by the bureaucracy, in that only four of the ten systems actually channelled decisional activity toward the cabinet level."¹⁸⁵ And specifically in relation to defence, policy-making activity was centred in close cooperation at the senior official level between External Affairs and DND.¹⁸⁶

It will be recalled that perhaps the key issue in assessing the consequences of bureaucratic politics is the gap between executive intent and organizational output. For certain types of issues all that matters to the executive is that a positive choice has been made, and details of implementation are inconsequential. On what were perceived by the Trudeau government as the less important issues, the positive choice consideration would appear to have been the primary - if not the only - concern. This presupposed that once given direction, departments would simply follow through on implementation in the mechanistic manner expected of bureaucracies. In any event, this activity would supposedly be monitored by the restructured central agencies

¹⁸⁵Kirton, *Foreign policy decision-making in the Trudeau government: promise and performance*, p. 299.

¹⁸⁶Ibid., p. 296.

mentioned earlier. Positive choice in isolation from concern for implementation might well be viable on less important issues, but it presupposes two considerations: that a clear direction as to how the issues are to be addressed is apparent from the positive choice or directive - that is, the values and factual premises are specified - and that the issues will remain less important over time.

In the case of defence issues, neither of these requirements was met. The 1971 White Paper was noteworthy for establishing as a first priority the issue of protection of Canadian sovereignty, an issue which was at best nebulous and at worst - in isolation from the second and third priorities (NORAD and NATO) - meaningless. It would seem that the Trudeau government neglected to consider that rational pursuit of an organization's objectives by a bureaucrat is possible only to the extent that he is able to pursue a course of action, that he has a correct conception of the objective of the action, and the parameters of his action have been communicated to him. This must be considered a major error of omission on the part of a government which purported to be attuned to the rational requirements of governmental activity, and it should not be surprising if the affected bureaucracy inserted organizational values - indulged in political irrationality - to fill the gap. Was this just the position that DND wanted to be in? This could well have been the case, but such an arrangement may not be a long-term benefit to a less

influential department, a question which will be addressed in detail in part two of this chapter. Nor was the omission rectified when defence issues became a more important consideration a measure of the reluctance with which government accepted this importance and, whether by default or design, a reinforcement of whatever bureaucratic political activities were taking place.

From the preceding analysis the importance of establishing an objective theoretical basis with which the decision-making approach chosen by the Trudeau government may be compared will be apparent. The effects of organizational/governmental process, to the extent that they were perceived at all, were attributed to bureaucratic intransigence, a problem which was to be rectified by greater central control operationalized through organizational-structural change.

The Effects of Organizational-Structural Change

Organizational and structural change was the framework upon which the Trudeau government's efforts to rationalize governmental activity rested. In part this encompassed the ten systems which attempted to coordinate and control the formulation of foreign policy. But it had a broader scope than this; one which touched upon not only the considerations of organizational theory, but also decision theory in the context of comprehensive rationality and bureaucratic politics. Thus it should not be surprising

that structural change had important consequences for departmental activity. How successful were the government's efforts? Adie and Thomas succinctly comment:

To the extent that they were oversold, disappointment was perhaps inevitable, but after discounting for the hyperbole which usually accompanies administrative reforms the structural changes introduced by the Trudeau government can perhaps fairly be seen as a mixture of limited success and a greater measure of failure.¹⁸⁷

Perhaps a more important question is, were the government's efforts an application of corporate planning? Were one to rely upon government rhetoric for evidence, the structural reforms and procedural changes that were implemented were certainly sold as corporate planning. In addition, if one compares the common perception of corporate planning practice and corporate planning weaknesses to the practice of the Trudeau government and the weaknesses which were subsequently revealed, there are striking similarities. There was, in the Canadian case, a decided over-emphasis on structural change and the introduction of new procedures, and this mechanistic approach ignored the requirement to consider political and organizational behaviour. Over-centralization was also a characteristic of the government's reforms. The central agencies, the PMO and PCO, were remote in both geographical and philosophical terms from the departments whose support they needed to cultivate. Nor was promotion of collaboration or

¹⁸⁷ Adie and Thomas, Canadian public Administration, p. 106.

inter-corporate planning successful in the context of being controlled by the central agencies. The central agencies were perceived as a threat to departmental interests, and the result was that the departments indulged in dynamic conservatism to circumvent or overcome the threat. The coordinative efforts of the central agencies were undermined through bureaucratic cooption of planning activity; active resistance to what was perceived as unwarranted superbureaucratic interference. In addition, there was no integration of political values below the central agency level; these agencies were too closely tied to particular political personalities and were not seen to be servicing government as a whole. To the extent that inter-corporate planning did occur, it could well be described as a manifestation of dynamic conservatism. An example of this was collaboration at the senior official level which occurred, indeed still occurs, between DND and External Affairs.

It would appear that the Trudeau government did practice corporate planning of a sort. However, it was corporate planning in the most restricted sense of the term, and therefore it should not be surprising that it was subject to the same limitations or criticisms which Hambleton attributes to corporate planning as it is commonly perceived. A more appropriate description of the Trudeau government's approach, with its predilection for a comprehensive rational focus, might be rationalized planning

- rationalized in the pejorative sense posited by Weber. This directed planning may well have involved the corporate whole, but the involvement took the form of the imposition of demands on certain parts of that corporate entity - the departments - which the latter did not have the resources to meet. For example, DND could scarcely have been expected to provide effective policy advice/planning data on an area - specifically, sovereignty - in which government had not seen fit to provide factual premises or parameters. At the same time, rationalized planning reinforced both bureaucratic politics - or dynamic conservatism - and bureaucratic reluctance to do other than to administer to departmental requirements.

However, as was argued in Chapter One, corporate planning is more than simply neat structures and tidy methods at the expense of content. Such an approach does not produce changes in process or result, particularly if planning attempts to impose its own framework on existing decision-making apparatus, if it fails to stimulate the commitment of the participants - be they politicians or bureaucrats - and if it ignores the organizational politics generated by planning and structural changes. This is precisely what the Trudeau government's planning did attempt, and it produced effects, which a less confined theoretical analysis could have predicted, on all departments - not the least those which were deemed less important such as Defence. Nor is corporate planning neat

structures and tidy methods built on a foundation of comprehensive rationality. This was essentially what the government's reforms entailed, structures which attempted to overcome incremental change by a rationalistic focus on long-term planning. But with the passage of time, the reality of incremental change caught up with the government, with the result that its long-term planning efforts became the process described by Doern as getting ready to get ready - that is, planning for long-term ends which were invariably relegated to the status of means by the demands of incremental or day-to-day decision-making requirements.

If the goal of change is the development of government bureaucracies which are sensitive to changing needs and capable of on-going adaptation of their own needs and behaviour - organizations which in a cybernetic sense learn how to learn - then what is required is corporate planning not in the context of the planning attempts made by the Trudeau government, but in the more meaningful theoretical context posited in Chapter One. Such corporate planning is that which seeks to enable rather than to impose a coordinated planning input. What is not required is what the Canadian experience produced, a structure and process which produced the form but not the reality of policy planning and analysis. The only purpose which this fulfilled was "... to impress visitors as a symbol of the foresight and capabilities of the organization ..."¹⁸⁸

¹⁸⁸ Aaron Wildavsky, *If Planning is Everything, Maybe it's Nothing*, Policy Sciences no. 4 (1973): 148, as cited in

But as the Trudeau government found in the context of defence, if symbols are seen to have no substance over time, they impress no one - least of all one's allies. What is required is an enabler through which the creative potential of departments can be released and effective corporate input achieved. Within this framework there is a definite role for a corporate planning body which services the needs of government as a whole. This role does not encompass the pursuits which Campbell and Szablowski suggest the PCO has been wont to indulge in; that is, duplicating the work done by the departments and purporting to be super-analysts with insight superior to that of departmental officials.¹⁸⁹

Indeed, those departments to which the government chooses to attach less importance, and whose ministers are disadvantaged by the less influential position which they hold in Cabinet, would benefit from the presence of an objective corporate planning body, one which would not attempt to filter out departmental advice which it felt the government might be politically uncomfortable with. It is a reasonable contention that filtering is precisely what Pitfield orchestrated when he chaired the 1975 defence review, in that it is doubtful that DND and External Affairs recommended the affirmation of the defence priorities which the 1971 White Paper had delineated.

¹⁸⁸(cont'd)Prince and Chenier, *The rise and fall of policy planning and research units: an organizational perspective*, p.539.

¹⁸⁹Campbell and Szablowski, The Superbureaucrats, pp. 82-83.

Kirton suggests that government objectives have changed with the accumulation of experience and that,

... these later revisions reflect in part the Prime Minister's general disenchantment with the belief that large organizations in the political arena are susceptible to rapid reform and continuous coordination from the top. To a great extent however, they stem from a calculation that domestic and external environments no longer require, and may not permit, such *dirigisme* ...¹⁹⁰

This may well offer a viable explanation for the conclusions to which the Prime Minister was led in his pursuit of a more rational and formal approach to decision-making in the defence and foreign policy spheres. Certainly it is an explanation which has been reinforced by an examination of the extent to which the Trudeau government as an erstwhile rational actor has been influenced by both the politics of the governmental or organizational process and, perhaps more importantly, bureaucratic politics.

There are two important messages in the relative failure of the government's coordinated policy planning efforts, messages which the disillusionment which stems from failure might all too easily obscure. The first message, directed at the politician, is that rationalized planning in the context described earlier is not corporate planning. Corporate planning may yet offer at least a partial solution to the increasing complexities of governmental activity, but only if it is properly applied. Indeed, had corporate

¹⁹⁰Kirton, *Foreign policy decision-making in the Trudeau government: promise and performance*, p. 308.

planning been properly applied, the Trudeau government might have come to a more timely recognition of the viable role which defence issues can play in the formulation of foreign policy. The second, and potentially more important, message is for the departmental bureaucrat: that a vital part of the political/bureaucratic interface is the responsibility of the bureaucrat to provide policy advice and recommendations, which reflect the political constraints under which he knows the politician must operate. The departmental bureaucrat must not renege on this responsibility, on the excuse that it is not his place to offer policy advice. Indeed, it would seem from the data that such reticence or failure of bureaucratic interests, generally, to accept their policy advisory responsibilities, moved the government to create policy planning and research units. James Forrestal, the first U.S. Secretary of Defense, offered a useful observation with regard to bureaucrats and the policy advice issue:

I have always been amused by those who say they are willing to go into government but they are not willing to go into politics. My answer ... is that you can no more divorce government from politics than you can separate sex from creation.¹⁹¹

Nor can the bureaucrat simply resort to bureaucratic politics, and assume that this will provide the necessary political input. Bureaucratic politics cannot be wished away, and it may even be said to be beneficial to the extent that it responsibly promotes departmental interests. If it

¹⁹¹ Allison, Essence of Decision, p. 147.

extends beyond these parameters, it deprives the politician of the role which he, as an elected official, must play in setting the values - and the factual premises and parameters - upon which decision/policy-making is based. And bureaucratic politics may be a double-edge sword, in that a politician may skilfully play on it to the extent that he finds useful, while at the same time using it as an excuse to ignore as bureaucratic meddling any inputs with which he is uncomfortable - and which might be construed as according a department real influence. These latter considerations have important implications for certain aspects of government and departmental activity which are discussed in the section which follows.

C. Canadian Military Participation in NATO Since 1969

In analyzing Canada's military participation in NATO since 1969, certain questions arise. Was the 1969 defence review necessary; that is, was there a need for a fundamental change? More specifically, were the reasons given for it really representative of the government's intent? What was the actual effect of the review on Canada's military participation in the Alliance and why? What was the rationale for the seeming turn-about in the government's attitude towards NATO which, in effect, began in the early Seventies? What have been and will be the consequences of the changes which began with the defence review of 1969, for Canada's military participation in NATO

over time?

The Need For Review

Prime Minister Trudeau contended that Canada's foreign political pyramid had become inverted, that foreign policy flowed from defence, when in fact the reverse of this should be the case. Therefore, there was a need for a review of foreign policy and, concurrently, a defence review which would place the latter in a proper perspective in relation to overall policy. But was there a need for review on the grounds which the Prime Minister had posited? Harald von Riekhoff comments:

The claim that Canadian foreign policy was subordinate to defence policy does not seem convincing, particularly when one considers the modest decision-making input coming from the Canadian military. Even with respect to NATO there were significant foreign political and not merely strategic considerations which determined Canada's contribution to the alliance.¹⁹²

And, more specifically related to defence, Von Riekhoff added,

... the reduction of Canadian forces in Europe ... bears the strong imprint of a hastily improvised political compromise which could have been arranged equally well without the intellectual guidance of a fundamental review.¹⁹³

The Prime Minister was well aware of the benefits which NATO

¹⁹²Von Riekhoff, *The impact of Prime Minister Trudeau on foreign policy*, p. 271.

¹⁹³Ibid., p. 274.

offered as a milieu for international political consultation and discussion. His predecessors, particularly Lester Pearson who had been influential as both a bureaucrat and politician in the formative and later years of the Alliance, had all subscribed to the attributes of NATO as a political forum. Von Riekhoff's comment that the decision-making input of the Canadian military was a modest one is well-founded. Indeed, Canada's military forces have never enjoyed a position of political influence remotely akin to that of their contemporaries in the U.S. or Britain for example. In light of these considerations, one is inclined to agree with Von Riekhoff's comments and, that being so, one is also led to speculate on the perceptions which provided the impetus for the decision to review defence and foreign policy.

At the time of the defence and foreign policy reviews, Mr. Trudeau was either disinclined to accept the inseparability of defence and foreign policy or, and perhaps a more accurate perception of his inclinations, he chose to ignore the linkage. Trudeau had no desire to live in the shadow of Pearson, particularly so because he neither accepted the Pearsonian style of government, nor shared Pearson's internationalist predilections. However, Trudeau was wary, and rightly so, of trying to implement too much change too soon. His predecessor had all but single-handedly brought Canada into the international limelight, and it would be accurate to say that Canadians

had come to identify with the country's image as an international mediator of some repute - a helpful fixer. Thordarson comments that, "[T]he public approved of Canada's alliance commitments and support of peacekeeping ..."¹⁹⁴ A turn-around of policy without ample justification would thus not only not have been well-received in a general sense - and here it must be remembered that the Trudeau government had only just entered office - but also, and perhaps more importantly, it would not have been accepted by old guard Liberals upon whom Trudeau was still dependent for a measure of support. How valid is this analysis? Supporting evidence is to be found in the majority, opposition opinion which surfaced in the course of the review process, not the least that from Cabinet ministers such as Paul Martin and Leo Cadieux, both of whom had been Cabinet ministers in the Pearson government.¹⁹⁵

It would seem, on the basis of Thordarson's operational code analysis, that the down-playing of defence policy suited Mr. Trudeau's personal philosophy and his desire to emphasize domestic concerns. Similarly, it suited the inclinations of the like thinkers in the Trudeau government, not only the new Cabinet ministers such as Donald MacDonald, but also the personal policy advisers with whom the Prime Minister had surrounded himself. A blatant forward defence policy had little appeal for a Prime Minister who perceived

¹⁹⁴Thordarson, Trudeau and Foreign Policy: A study in decision-making, p. 109.

¹⁹⁵Ibid., pp. 26,45,106,144,156 (note particularly the explanatory footnote), and 157.

protection of sovereignty and aid to the civil power as more appropriate pursuits for Canada's armed forces. Mr. Trudeau offered the excuse that such a reorientation would both reassure armed forces personnel that they had a viable role to play and convince the public that there was a place for military forces in Canada.¹⁹⁶ But the evidence would suggest that if any such reassurances were required, they were more in the nature of a source of rationalization for what the Prime Minister wished to do.¹⁹⁷ The Canadian Armed Forces had no reservations about their existing NATO role, nor is there evidence to suggest that the general public felt the need to have the Force's role justified. However, such considerations were of little consequence to Mr. Trudeau, who took the position that while the public might express an opinion, government made the decisions.¹⁹⁸ More succinctly, "There's nobody to tell me how the country should be run ... I tell them."¹⁹⁹

Given that the Trudeau government's overriding concern was that foreign policy planning and decision-making were very much in need of revision, the question was how to sell the idea. In the late Sixties detente appeared to be working, and there was some justification for the claim that security interests were no longer a pressing concern. It would seem that it was upon this consideration - transitory though it was to prove to be - and the government's own

¹⁹⁶Ibid., p. 141.

¹⁹⁷Ibid., pp. 157-58.

¹⁹⁸Ibid., p. 159.

¹⁹⁹Thordarson, Trudeau and Foreign Policy, p. 85.

narrow perception of policy priorities, that the claim that defence policy enjoyed a disproportionate influence in relation to foreign policy was based. What better solution than to call for a review of both defence and foreign policy? The mystification of the audience of Calgary Liberals to whom the Prime Minister first put this claim may be said to be representative of the response which it elicited generally. The important consideration was that the government had convinced itself, or been convinced:

[I]t is more likely that it was the Prime Minister who was the guiding light and who provided the decisive input for the foreign policy review. It was primarily his decision, based on his interpretation of the internal and external environments, to conduct the review in the first place, and it was his views, influenced only marginally by outside advice, that determined its direction.²⁰⁰

The defence review proved, not surprisingly, to be less of a review than a fait accompli. It was completed better than a year prior to the overall foreign policy review, and lip-service was paid to consulting a wide range of interests. Reports were submitted by DND, External Affairs and the Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, all of which recommended maintenance of the status quo in terms of Canada's military commitment to NATO. This was obviously not the response which the government was looking for, and the Prime Minister directed

²⁰⁰Thordarson, Trudeau and Foreign Policy: A study in decision-making, p. 119.

Ivan Head to provide a further report. Ivan Head had once commented, "I don't think it hurts the mandarins to know that the Prime Minister has people in his office with both experience and ability to challenge what comes up."²⁰¹ And challenge he did, for Head produced a report which recommended the partial withdrawal of Canada's NATO force from Europe. Whatever else might be said of this report, it was certainly politic, in that it provided an answer which both the Prime Minister and his supporters, and those Liberals who were more internationally inclined, could live with. As an aside, the report is a further excellent example of the superbureaucratic meddling referred to earlier. Did Ivan Head have the experience and ability to challenge the findings of the Common's Standing Committee and the two departments which were most closely attuned to the NATO issue? In that he is an international lawyer and former foreign service officer, one might have expected his report to present a picture of foreign policy which tempered the subjective assessment of the political sphere of government and which reflected the real politik of the issues.²⁰² That such a picture was not presented is evidenced by Western European reaction to the force reduction and the Trudeau government's diplomatic fence-mending exercise which began to take shape shortly after that reduction. Therefore it would seem that in the

²⁰¹Globe and Mail, January 15, 1969, p. 9, as cited in Thordarson, p. 89.

²⁰²Ibid., pp. 88-89.

context of the 1969 defence review, Mr. Head's experience and ability were somewhat misdirected or misplaced. In challenging what came up he might have been better advised to direct that challenge towards the Prime Minister's misperceptions regarding the NATO issue. While this would not have enhanced his rapport with Mr. Trudeau in the short-term, it might have contributed to a more timely appreciation by the Prime Minister of the long-term importance of a materially credible military commitment to NATO. In light of the report which he did produce, Ivan Head's contribution to the defence review will perhaps be remembered best as that of a superbureaucrat in the pejorative sense implied by Campbell and Szablowski.

It would be fair to say that some sort of revision of Canada's military commitment to NATO was a foregone conclusion, given the priorities of the Trudeau government. Indeed, the impetus for change had been reinforced by the earlier pronouncements of Lester Pearson, the man who had in great part orchestrated the original commitment. Perhaps the difference was that Pearson, whatever doubts he may have had about the continued efficacy of Canada's military contribution to NATO, had sufficient experience in the international sphere to appreciate better when a change in that contribution might be justified and when it might not. Mr. Pearson was to claim later that had he continued as Prime Minister he would have taken, by the early Seventies, a similar decision to reduce Canada's NATO commitment.

However, in light of changing events on the international scene, such as the weakening of detente, events which caused even the Trudeau government to have second thoughts, it seems unlikely that someone of Pearson's diplomatic and political experience would in fact have taken such a decision.

It is equally clear that at no time prior to or during the review was total withdrawal from NATO seriously contemplated - certainly not as far as Mr. Trudeau was concerned. Such a withdrawal would have meant the end of access to a valuable international political forum, a loss which even someone who was "...neither well informed on international affairs nor particularly interested in them ..." ²⁰³ could appreciate. While one might argue that the immediacy of the defence review was the result of budgetary planning considerations and the knowledge that the annual NATO review was pending, there is stronger evidence to suggest that the defence policy issue provided a convenient catalyst, if not a red herring, in terms of justifying an overall policy review. This contention is supported, as preceding discussion suggests, by the evidence that there was general support for a status quo approach to foreign and defence policy.

²⁰³Thordarson, Trudeau and Foreign Policy: A study in decision-making, p. 85.

The Aftermath

Although the Trudeau government had not contemplated complete withdrawal from NATO, it is certainly the case that a substantial reduction of Canadian forces from Europe had been considered. Indeed, a two-thirds reduction would appear to have been the planning figure subsequent to the Head report. However, Mr. Trudeau had also announced that the reduction would be conducted in consultation with Canada's NATO allies. The reaction of these allies has been described in some detail in Chapter Two, and there is little doubt that it was instrumental in the government's decision only to halve its NATO contingent in Europe. As much was admitted by Leo Cadieux in the House of Commons when he stated that, "... as a result of consultation with our allies, we had modified considerably our original plan."²⁰⁴

Little more than a year after the NATO force reduction had been announced, the Trudeau government released the White Paper on Defence. The Paper, as has been mentioned, re-ordered Canada's defence priorities, and it should not be surprising that Donald MacDonald held the Defence portfolio at the time. It will be remembered that he had been an advocate of a substantial change in Canada's NATO role, and what better choice as the man to review defence priorities than Macdonald, who would ensure that the government's intentions were brought to fruition - primarily because he would be least receptive to the posturings of DND

²⁰⁴Ibid., p. 142. (My emphasis)

bureaucrats, both military and civilian. Suffice to say that the government's confidence was well placed. This would also seem to fit the conceptual consideration that when one wants to ensure that fundamental policy change is reflected in organizational activity or implementation, manipulation through a change of organizational leadership provides a solution.

With the release of the 1971 White Paper, which emphasized that defence policy must be congruent with foreign policy - the projection abroad of national interests - one would have expected some definitive statements on this congruence. It is perhaps a measure of the real perceptions of the Trudeau government as to the importance of defence policy, that the role of the armed forces in support of foreign policy objectives was virtually ignored. R.B. Byers comments:

By inference, the government indicated that the fulfilment of defence objectives was not that important in the pursuit of its primary foreign policy objectives. The downgrading of the peace and security theme, along with the emphasis on economic growth, suggested that objectives in these policy areas could be achieved irrespective of Canada's defence posture [T]he CAF [Canadian Armed Forces] were not considered essential for the achievement of major foreign policy objectives - that is, a successful marriage took place [that is, defence and foreign policy], but one partner was not really necessary for the well-being of the relationship.²⁰⁵

Thus defence issues, which previous Canadian governments had

²⁰⁵ Byers, *Defence and foreign policy in the 1970s: the demise of the Trudeau Doctrine*, pp. 319-20. (My emphasis)

considered a necessary part of corporate planning, were all but excluded from foreign policy planning. Although the Third Option was to cause the government to re-think this perception, in the interim the government had reverted to the mind-set which J.F. Anderson so aptly described as,

... a tendency ... to view collective defence ... as being, at best, of marginal importance and at worst dispensible, and a tendency in parallel to see the Canadian Forces as a piece of baggage, which perforce had to be carried around in pursuit of various foreign policy goals, but which for that reason should be kept as light as possible.²⁰⁶

Defence policy was relegated to a back burner while the government got on with the business of addressing more domestically-oriented concerns, specifically the economy and issues relating to Canadian unity.

The designation of protection of Canadian sovereignty as the primary defence priority was, of course, a reflection of the government's more domestic policy orientation. The problem was, what did protection of sovereignty really mean? Bruce Thordarson comments:

A defence policy based on considerations of sovereignty was such a novelty on the Canadian scene that there was some concern that the government might be intending to regard it as an end in itself and as something that had to be defended in its entirety.²⁰⁷

²⁰⁶Anderson, *Strategy, Policy Formulation, and Military Planning*, p. 6.

²⁰⁷Thordarson, Trudeau and Foreign Policy: A study in decision-making

However, Thordarson goes on to comment that the White Paper clarified this issue, and that sovereignty was precisely defined as, "... the idea that any national government had to be capable of surveillance and control activities over its own land, territorial waters and airspace."²⁰⁸ While Thordarson might have been satisfied with the preciseness of this definition, it is by no means clear that the department which had to operationalize protection of sovereignty held the same view.

It was readily apparent to DND that the government was not referring to protection of sovereignty in its entirety, if for no other reason than the fact that the defence budget had been frozen and Forces manpower levels had been reduced. And, with the possible exception of the period immediately following World War Two, Canada never had the military capability to provide the surveillance and control which the above definition implied. In addition, DND was expected to plan some measure of support for the other three defence priorities, an expectation which was implicit in such White Paper specifications as the requirement that Canada's Maritime forces be "... reoriented with the long-term objective of providing a more versatile general purpose capability."²⁰⁹ This versatile general purpose capability requirement extended to Canada's Land and Air forces, and thus required DND to plan for general purpose military

²⁰⁸ Ibid., p. 161.

²⁰⁹ Canada, White Paper On Defence: Defence In the 70s (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1971), p. 28, as cited in Stewart, Canada's European Force: 1971-1980, p. 12.

organizational and logistic frameworks, and indulge in the pursuit of the elusive multi-role vehicle, aircraft or ship. One has but to consult a reputable military technical journal such as the International Defence Review, to realize that the cost of multi-role equipment - to the extent that there is such a thing - is exceedingly high. Even before the advent of the defence review and subsequent budget freeze, DND lacked the financial resources to fulfill a multi-role or general purpose requirement, and after the review and White Paper came to fruition, the department was expected to fulfill the requirement with still fewer resources. The government would have done well to remember that while it might be possible to acquire such a capability, it does not come cheaply. To suppose otherwise is to risk the creation of something which does several jobs marginally and no one job well or, worse, is incapable overall. In an organizational process context, the government could have anticipated that DND would do its part in terms of what it knew how to do, a knowledge which did not extend to a clear perception of how to apply the department's limited resources to a somewhat nebulous role.

How did DND cope with the **official** defence priorities specified in the 1971 White Paper? The department fully realized that it did not have the resources to meet the first priority and, furthermore, there was some doubt as to precisely what the government envisaged in protection of sovereignty. Nor was the government forthcoming with any

clarification. Given that DND had to meet this priority and, in some way, shape or form the other three, it is hypothesized that the department indulged in satisficing. Protection of sovereignty could not be dealt with in isolation, for reasons which already have been discussed. The NORAD and NATO commitments were perceived as complementary, and peace-keeping required - at least in a basic sense - the maintenance of military skills which the NATO commitment provided. Essentially, DND factored the priorities down to the one with which it could most readily, perhaps traditionally, identify - the NATO commitment, albeit reduced. The department thus actively continued to pursue the priority upon which it had always focussed and which, it could argue with some justification, encompassed protection of sovereignty to the extent that it was realistically possible.

Can this hypothesis be supported? Certain evidence suggests that it can. In a confidential interview a civil servant, who was acquainted with the departmental responses which the White Paper had elicited, observed that neither DND nor External Affairs had agreed with the priorities from the outset, and that departmental activity had proceeded accordingly - albeit with lip-service being paid to the first defence priority.²¹⁰ Evidence of this lip-service is to be found in the Arctic sovereignty over-flights conducted by CAF aircraft. However, as R.B. Byers comments, "...

²¹⁰ Discussion with Department of External Affairs official, 25 March, 1983.

senior DND officials have argued that the priority attached to military involvement in the north can be kept low relative to other areas of military activity ... and [the sovereignty role] was never considered by senior personnel as the major focus of CAF activities."²¹¹ The reality of the situation was that these flights were the first task to be discontinued when the financial crisis of 1974 brought about a reduction of flying hours as part of a budgetary restraint. At the same time, there was only a marginal discontinuation of NATO-related flying activity and, even though Parliamentary pressure forced partial re-implementation of the Arctic flights, there can be little doubt as to where DND perceived defence priorities to lie.

Stewart suggests that the cut-back in sovereignty protection-related activity primarily was due to an overall government reassessment of the importance of Canada's NATO role. This may have been part of the explanation, but it seems doubtful that it was the complete one. Earlier, in the context of structural reforms, it was noted that defence was one of the six systems which did not channel decision-making activity through to Cabinet, but rather pursued such activity at the senior official level on an inter-departmental basis, primarily with External Affairs. This consideration and the comments of the civil servant referred to earlier, would suggest that the cut-back was more likely a case of successful manifestation of positive

²¹¹R.B.Byers, *Defence and foreign policy in the 1970s*, p. 326-26.

bureaucratic political activity in DND and External Affairs - which had continued to promote the importance of NATO - combined with a growing realization on the part of the Trudeau government that enhanced relations with Western Europe, and the NATO policies related thereto, were important. But to the extent that it existed, this latter realization was a gradual occurrence, for as Byers comments, "With the completion of the [overall policy] review, the Prime Minister probably felt he had placed the relationship between foreign policy and defence policy in proper perspective"²¹² Thus it would seem reasonable to assume with respect to defence policy that there was ample latitude for slippage, in the bureaucratic politics context, between executive intent and implementation, and that this slippage did in fact occur.

Renewed Interest In NATO

An immediate result of the 1974 financial crisis and related assessment of possible budget adjustments, was the government's realization that DND's resources could not only not be reduced further, but also that it was underfunded and over-tasked. There was also the growing awareness of the importance of European relations. These considerations stimulated the 1974-75 defence structure review, which resulted in the allocation of greater importance to Canada's NATO commitment. In addition to the review, Prime Minister

²¹²Ibid., p. 319.

Trudeau visited NATO headquarters for the first time in October 1974, and he emphasized the importance which Canada attached to NATO membership. By the mid-Seventies, the Trudeau government appeared to have undergone a significant change of attitude toward its military responsibilities in NATO. The use of the word **appeared** is appropriate because what was involved was less an attitudinal change and more a realization that Canadian and European perceptions of an acceptable level of military participation in the Alliance did not coincide. This also suggests that, conceptually, the government was still very much means oriented; in this instance, defence policy as a means to a better relationship with Western Europe, a relationship which was in itself a means. In any event, the Canadian-European perception gap had to be closed if the European link was to be maintained and enhanced. Thus one finds Mr. Trudeau stating to NATO allies "... Canada's [unequivocal] belief in the concept of collective security,"²¹³ and James Richardson lamenting the fact that the considerations which shape Canada's contribution are "... all too often at best inadequately understood in the perspective within which many of our allies view Canada's role in NATO."²¹⁴ It would be counter-productive to dwell on the rhetoric of Trudeau, and Richardson and his successors, except to note that the other members of the Alliance were unimpressed with the attempts of the Trudeau governments to portray a born again

²¹³Ibid., p. 332.

²¹⁴Richardson, *Canada and NATO*, p. 4.

militarist approach. As Byers observes, "If other actors in the international system ... do not perceive a country's defence posture as credible, they will naturally question the seriousness of the objectives it is supporting"²¹⁵ Perhaps truer words could not have been spoken of the Canadian defence posture of the time, which was still long on rhetoric and short on action. Had the Prime Minister been sufficiently interested in the potential uses to which defence policy could be put - that is, in its corporate viability - he might have come to a more timely realization of what James Eayrs had so aptly stated in 1969: "It is equally legitimate, and at times more important, for military establishments to support foreign policy in other areas [than national security] - particularly in the economic and political spheres."²¹⁶ Indeed had Mr. Trudeau realized this at the time of the 1969 defence review, six years later he might not have been faced with European skepticism as to the seriousness of Canada's NATO commitment.

In fairness it must be said that the Trudeau government's renewed emphasis on NATO, which is after all a military alliance and is so perceived by most members, was due in part to a realization that East-West tensions had not relaxed, contrary to earlier impressions. However, the evidence strongly suggests that there was an ulterior and

²¹⁵ Byers, *Defence and foreign policy in the 1970s: the demise of the Trudeau Doctrine*, p. 315.

²¹⁶ James Eayrs, as quoted in Byers, p. 315.

more important motivation - economic benefits. The Prime Minister took no part in NATO discussions until the Third Option came to the fore, and even then he appeared to think that new, or perhaps more vociferous rhetoric in support of NATO, without any real change in Canada's military participation, would suffice. There is no evidence to suggest that he solicited the advice, a corporate input so to speak, from DND who, in light of the connections with their West German counterparts alluded to by Held, could have provided a useful assessment of European perceptions on the NATO issue.²¹⁷ while it was never explicitly stated that the price of the contractual Link with Western Europe was a more meaningful contribution to the security aspects of the Alliance, one encounters the rumour concerning the pressure put on Mr. Trudeau by West German Chancellor, Helmut Schmidt, and pragmatically "... merely maintaining a token **European presence** proved insufficient to secure German support, doubly vital in light of reservations harboured by both Britain and France vis-a-vis the framework agreement as unduly stretching the EC's external competencies."²¹⁸ The attachment of Western European members to the defence aspects of the Alliance cannot have been lost on the Trudeau government. As David Humphreys contends, "It is inconceivable that the impact of one on the other [that is, Canada's NATO commitment and the European attitude towards

²¹⁷Held, *Canadian Foreign Policy: An Outsider's View*, p. 452.

²¹⁸Strempe, *Towards Complex Interdependence: Canada and the European Community: 1958-1980*, p. 180.

the Contractual Link] was not considered at the highest political levels."²¹⁹ And support for this contention is to be found in comments made by Mr. Trudeau in a House of Commons address:

... [I]n so far as the application of economic cooperation is concerned, it is possible that certain purchases of military equipment are envisaged [I]t might be relevant ... [that] I did discuss the question of NATO when I was in Europe and very often with the same people when I was discussing economic cooperation.²²⁰

"Even less cryptically, a German editorialist was told that the 'Leopards [tanks] ... for which we have no use on our continent' ... embodied Canada's 'European engagement' "²²¹ In addition, it has been suggested by an External Affairs official, who served on the Canadian Delegation to the North Atlantic Council from 1974-76 and who was present during the Framework Agreement negotiations, that European delegates had made it very clear that a more meaningful Canadian contribution to NATO was the price for an economic link with Western Europe.²²²

In any event, changes were made to Canada's NATO posture, and whether these changes were the result of actual

²¹⁹David Humphreys, *Canada's link with Europe still not widely understood*, International Perspectives (March/April 1976): 34.

²²⁰Hansard, 18 February 1976, pp. 11051-52, as cited in Strempel, *Towards Complex Interdependence: Canada and the European Community: 1958-1980*, p. 181.

²²¹Citation in Robert Held, *Unser Verbundeter Kanada*, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 17 May 1977, as cited and translated by Strempel, p. 181.

²²²Discussion with Department of External Affairs official, 25 March 1983.

or anticipated pressure, the result was the same. However, the changes were somewhat cosmetic, as the Senate Subcommittee Report of 1982 and reference to any recent reputable assessment of the contributions of NATO members - such as the International Institute of Strategic Studies' Military Balance - amply illustrate. For example, enough new tanks - West German **Leopards** - were bought to maintain the effectiveness of the Royal Canadian Dragoons, the Canadian armoured regiment based in Germany. But not enough tanks were bought to provide ongoing training for the three armoured regiments based in Canada which, incidentally, provide replacement personnel for the Dragoons. In addition, new long range patrol aircraft were acquired, well-suited to the NATO anti-submarine warfare role, but only half the number necessary to adequately deal with the NATO role and the sovereignty protection requirement which, it must be remembered, continues to be a priority.^{2 2 3} As the changes were implemented they were matched with a rhetoric in which the Canadian government's perceptions of the non-military benefits of NATO were thinly, if at all, disguised: "... to exert influence on the policies of our allies."^{2 2 4} The Senate Subcommittee Report, commenting on the re-equipment of the Canadian Forces in the mid-Seventies, provides a noteworthy interpretation of what

^{2 2 3} Captain M. Walker, *A Partner for Aurora: Developing the Airborne Corvette*, Canadian Defence Quarterly 6 no. 4 (Spring 1977): 6.

^{2 2 4} Canada, DND, The 1981-82 Estimates for the Department of National Defence, p. 10.

was meant by influence: "... to maintain and improve relations with its [Canada's] allies, including trade and other links with Western Europe.^{2 2 5} Of particular interest is the government's decision on a new jet fighter aircraft, taken after the signing of the Framework Agreement.

Panavia, a European consortium, had offered the Tornado as a candidate, an aircraft chosen by the airforces of Britain, West Germany and Italy. Canada rejected the aircraft on the grounds of cost and doubt as to its capability as an interceptor, and chose instead the McDonnell-Douglas F-18/CF-18 Hornet. But, the basis of this choice must be open to question in light of the fact that the Royal Air Force has introduced an Air Defence variant of the Tornado, and the F-18 has been the subject of controversy concerning not only its final cost, but also its ability to carry out its multi-role mission. This may have reflected, as Byers would suggest, the declining importance of the Third Option as a major consideration in the Trudeau Doctrine.^{2 2 6}

However, Dewitt and Kirton have recently produced a well documented argument that the perceived decline of the Third Option was more imagined than real; a perception which stemmed from a misunderstanding of Third Option policy.^{2 2 7} Thus it would seem equally if not more plausible that the rejection of the Tornado reflected the government's

^{2 2 5}Canada, Senate, First Report, p. 12.

^{2 2 6}Byers, *Defence and foreign policy in the 1970s: the demise of the Trudeau doctrine*, p. 335.

^{2 2 7}This argument is elucidated in Dewitt and Kirton, Canada As A Principal Power, pp. 154-65.

disinclination to acknowledge the linkage of defence and foreign policy issues, in this instance defence equipment procurement and economic diversification, beyond the extent necessary to achieve ratification of the Framework Agreement. If such was the case it provides further evidence of the subjectively selective corporate policy planning in which the Trudeau government was wont to indulge.

Consequences

Professor Byers observes that, "... the dictates of the Third Option coincided with the more natural inclination of senior military personnel to perceive NATO participation as the primary defence activity."²²⁸ The fate of the Third Option notwithstanding, the government should have been left with a clearer perception of the inseparability of defence and foreign policy. It finally had to assign some value to Canada's military contribution to NATO - the problem alluded to earlier by DND's Assistant Deputy Minister (Policy), Mr. J.F. Anderson. However, as Byers has noted, while Canada's commitment was rehabilitated politically, officially it has remained of secondary importance.²²⁹ And the comments made by Rosetto in 1977 continue to hold true: "... What remains as defence policy is really a loose, uncoordinated ad hoc response to isolated problems"²³⁰

²²⁸ Byers, *Defence and foreign policy in the 1970s: the demise of the Trudeau doctrine*, p. 337.

²²⁹ Ibid., p. 39.

²³⁰ Rosetto, *A Final Look at the 1971 White Paper on Defence*,

D. Reflections

From the preceding analysis one can make certain observations concerning the conceptual questions raised in the introduction to the chapter. First, it would seem that comprehensive rational decision-making is not a solution to the process of incremental change. Indeed, the application of it reveals the very weaknesses posited by the theoretical assessment in Chapter One. These weaknesses are shared by the incrementalist approach, and both approaches rapidly degenerate into a process which has aptly been described as getting ready to get ready, policy-making means become ends in themselves and ends as such are never addressed. There is no room for value judgment-based decision-making which would define policy ends in either of the dominant approaches to decision-making in that both fundamentally involve rationalization, which by definition excludes ends.²³¹

Second, it would seem that corporate planning, or rather a misapplication of it in the form of rationalized planning, can provide a means by which organizational processes and bureaucratic politics may be influenced. However, the evidence provided by the data suggests that this influence is more in the nature of a disturbance than a control. Furthermore, it is apparent that rationalized

²³⁰(cont'd)pp. 61-61.

²³¹In this instance the rationalization referred to is that discussed by Weber; a focus on the mechanics of progress, on process rather than product. Pages 6 and 7 of this thesis refer.

planning which promotes neat structures and tidy methods at the expense of content is likely to reinforce the very activities which it is trying to change or control.

If the data contained in Chapter Two are representative of process and results in the context of policy planning, decision-making and implementation, it can be contended from the preceding analysis that the theoretical conceptions discussed in this thesis are valid as descriptive tools. These conceptions include the reality of incremental change, and the inability of a comprehensive rational approach or an incremental approach to address change in the context of policy ends.

V. Conclusion

Where does this thesis fit into the existing literature? Previous analyses of Canadian military participation in NATO during the Trudeau era appear to have followed two approaches: they have tended either towards a descriptive-historical approach, the work of Stewart for example, or towards military participation in NATO as a peripheral consideration contained in an operational code analysis of principal actors, such as Thordarson's analysis of Trudeau or the psycho-historical approach used by McCall-Newman in Grits. However, by employing a theoretical framework to examine the the relevant data, this thesis has provided a measure of explanation and an element of prescription not afforded by earlier analyses. In the context of future research, perhaps the most important question to be raised is whether or not a change of political leadership or, more dramatically, a change of government might lead to changes in the approach to policy decision-making, and the ramifications which this might have for bureaucratic political activity and hence policy implementation.

A. Conceptual Implications

On the basis of a preliminary assessment of the dominant approaches to planning and decision-making this thesis rejected the comprehensive rational and incrementalist approaches as prescriptions. Empirical

analysis of the data were produced in Chapters Two and Three not only as a means of verifying this assertion, but also as a test of the general hypothesis that misperception and misapplication of decision theory and organization theory invoke far-reaching, negative consequences for policy formulation and implementation.

What then are the broad conceptual implications?

First, it can be concluded that incremental change and its effects on planning and decision making can neither be ignored nor purposefully eliminated. Incrementalism is part of the reality of the social world. It is also apparent that where existing policies are in fact relatively satisfactory, as it would appear was the case with Canadian military participation in NATO, a politician should be wary of initiating fundamental change which is not based on an objective assessment and wherein an instrument of change is applied which excludes the value judgement-based decision-making for which the politician is responsible. This is not meant to infer that a politician should not or cannot initiate change, and this is certainly appropriate where a politician possesses new knowledge about a problem or goal. However, it is necessary to ensure that the approach which one applies will produce change in fact and not merely form, and new knowledge is not simply that which stems from the personal political-philosophical inclinations of the decision-maker or has been made to conform to those inclinations. Dror suggests that incremental change and an

incrementalist approach encourage inertia, but it would seem that over-emphasis on rationalism will have the same effect, intended or otherwise, on governmental activity - a sort of negative reinforcement.

Second, rationalization as it is embodied in the comprehensive rational and incrementalist approaches is a process which never quite delivers; that is, ends are not addressed. Thus, the politician who purports to apply these approaches, who attempts to rationalize the political world, automatically and artificially excludes the value or ends oriented judgments which are inherent to that world, whether he intends to or not. Conceptually, the politician succumbs to illusion. If such a politician combines this approach with a passion for a cause in the sense of a romanticism of the intellectually interesting, and if he lacks a sense of proportion - an ability to let realities work upon him - he may rightly be labelled a political dilettante. This is particularly true of the politician who pursues an ethic of ultimate ends with the view that it is others who are not in tune with the world - "The world is stupid and base, not I," "The responsibility for the consequences does not fall upon me but upon others whom I serve and whose stupidity and baseness I shall eradicate."^{2 3 2}

Third, it can be concluded that organizational processes, in terms of policy advice and implementation, are dominated by programs and procedures which are subject for

^{2 3 2}Gerth and Mills, From Max Weber, p. 127.

the most part to gradual change, and that political leaders can disturb but not control organizational behaviour. It is possible to force the change of routines and programmed responses by a change of organizational leadership, but this change is at best transitory and at worst purely cosmetic. Furthermore, the size of government precludes the making of all major decisions or directing of all major activities, in the context of policy implementation, by one central authority. This is true whether that central authority is represented for example by a prime minister and cabinet, or a planning appendage which too closely identifies with the central authority and thereby has no rapport with the organizational sub-units upon which it depends for information. The cost of the necessary factoring of problems and fractionating of power is measured in terms of the discretion which must be allowed organizations in the way they respond. An underlying consideration in this discretion is the effect of organizational parochialism, an effect which is present in all organizations and is amplified in those which are manned by careerists on a structural ladder. The degree to which government leaders are cognizant of and allow for the effects of administrative feasibilities as suggested by organizational process determines the gap between decision and implementation, and on all but pressing issues the gap widens in favour of the organization.

Fourth, bureaucratic politics is an influential factor wherever decision-making involves organizational input. The question to be asked is that of the extent of this influence. The extent varies in direct proportion to the degree of executive interest or commitment. Slippage may not seem to matter if the executive perception is that the only real issue is that a positive choice be made. But what if the perception of the importance of the issue is wrong? In such a case slippage can hurt and increasingly so with the passage of time, both in the context of bureaucratic political influence and in the context of lack of planning and decision-making in an area which is in reality more important than initial perceptions suggested. The message to be gleaned from all of this is that while one might be justifiably concerned about over-emphasizing the influence of bureaucratic politics, one also should be concerned about the consequences of discounting that influence.

What then have we learned about decision-making? Perhaps the most important consideration is that there is no single model or approach by which the decision-making process may be analyzed. Indeed, to paraphrase Allison, the best analysis may well draw upon a combination of models. Furthermore, an analysis of decision-making in the context of simply the mechanics of the process is insufficient in itself. One finds that the decisional process is shaped by what were referred to earlier as qualifiers; that is, organizational process and bureaucratic politics. These

qualifiers are part of what is and, to the extent that they are either acknowledged or ignored, they are determinants of what can be done.

Last, it should be appreciated that corporate planning is not rationalized planning which focusses on organizational/structural change, and which artificially filters or excludes certain corporate inputs from planning and decision-making simply because these inputs do not support a preconceived notion of what is important. An approach to planning which imposes rather than enables lacks the flexibility necessary to deal with the reality of incremental change because it discourages positive sub-unit response. Such an approach does not lead to a cybernetic learning process but rather to the inertia of getting ready to get ready. Finally, if corporate planning is to be operationalized successfully it must be perceived as a benefit by all of the participants. It must service government as a whole and not merely the centre of government or a planning office which totally identifies and is identified with that centre.

B. Empirical Implications

In the context of foreign policy in general and defence policy and the NATO commitment in particular, what did the Trudeau government want and why? What the government wanted was to change completely both the form and focus of existing policy planning and decision-making. A somewhat spurious

connection was made between an ostensibly anachronistic defence policy and the predominance of this policy in general foreign policy considerations. This connection was then used as justification for a review of both defence and foreign policy. As a result of this review, a coordinated, centralized, supposedly corporate planning approach to policy planning and formulation was implemented. In addition, Canada's NATO contingent in Europe was halved on the grounds of a diminished threat, and defence policy in general was relegated to a position of limited significance. In response to the government's contentions and the decisions taken, the evidence which this thesis has adduced strongly suggests that not only had foreign policy not been dominated by defence policy to the extent asserted by the Trudeau government, but also that there was little justification or general support for either a review or a subsequent change of foreign and defence policy focus. Nor, for that matter, had the threat on which the NATO commitment originally was predicated substantially diminished. However, the government was committed to change - not the least because of the impetus of Mr. Trudeau's personal political-philosophical inclinations - and change there would be. "The world is stupid and base, not I ...;" the flame of pure intentions was not to be quenched by contrary reports and assessments. It would seem that Mr. Trudeau's personal political-philosophical inclinations, in this instance a romanticism of the intellectually interesting

comprehensive rational model, were allowed to override a sense of proportion in a Weberian sense. Is there then a distinction between the Prime Minister's approach and that of the sterilely excited and mere political dilettante?

Departmental response to the changes made by the Trudeau governments was, in the context of organization and bureaucratic theory, predictable. The response was one of suspicion of the intentions of central planning agencies such as the PCO, and a disinclination to cooperate with them. And the superbureaucratic activities of these agencies, and the directed rather than corporate planning approach of the government, served to reinforce the negative departmental response. The overall results of the government's coordinated planning and decision-making efforts were discussed in Chapter Two. More specifically in the context of foreign policy, it will be remembered that defence, as one of the ten systems, did not become part of the centralized decision-making process, and that decision-making tended to take place at the senior official level. This process was undoubtedly enhanced by the low priority which the government attached to defence issues, and it would seem reasonable to conclude that with this slippage, bureaucratic politics became an increasingly important feature of DND activity. The redefinition of defence priorities, with protection of sovereignty taking precedence, lacked both clarity and conviction, clarity on the part of the government and conviction on the part of DND

and External Affairs. This change of defence priorities conforms to the pattern described in Chapter One, wherein a government is concerned only that a positive choice has been made, and not with the details of implementation. DND was able to continue to focus on NATO and merely to pay lip-service to protection of sovereignty as the primary defence requirement, a reflection not only of the marginal interest which the government evinced in defence, but also of the operationalization of bureaucratic politics to fill the gap created by that lack of interest.

The realities of planning and decision-making ultimately caught up with the Trudeau government, but the realization that incrementalism was the norm rather than the exception was to have a negative effect on defence capabilities. Where the government had originally seen fit to relegate defence considerations to a virtual limbo, thereby compounding existing problems of neglect in the defence sphere, it rather suddenly found it necessary incrementally to pick up the NATO commitment again. In that bureaucratic politics in DND had ensured that NATO activity was accorded real priority in DND - and quite probably External Affairs - the government was able to bring this activity to the fore as evidence to Western Europeans of Canada's ongoing commitment to the Alliance. But the positive and negative results of the underlying bureaucratic political activity must be recognized. Bureaucratic politics may have been a viable means of keeping NATO

activity operating effectively when government interest was focussed elsewhere, but that viability has diminished over time because the government has been able to tap very selectively only as much of that activity as it requires to be seen to be fulfilling its NATO commitment. This selective tapping is an illustration of one of the so-called advantages of having pursued a comprehensive rational approach, in this instance control of the bureaucracy. Recommendations or requests from DND for additional resources to meet the commitment can be and simply are brushed aside by the Trudeau government as "... the military lobby forgetting that the politician makes the decisions and the military carries them out."^{2 3 3} The latter consideration hints at the possibility that the government may not only have been aware of the implications/effectiveness of bureaucratic politics from the beginning, but also that it had planned to orchestrate this activity - thereby ensuring a continuing focus on NATO but not discrediting the appearance of its stated defence priorities. However, such an interpretation is less than convincing when one considers the government's, particularly Mr. Trudeau's, antipathy towards bureaucratic activity in general. Thus the earlier interpretation seems more likely; that is, that the government has found bureaucratic politics, which it had originally thought to eliminate, a convenient means of

^{2 3 3} Stephen Scott, *Cabinet under pressure to ease forces' spending*, Ottawa Citizen, 2 December 1974, p. 5, as cited in Stewart, Canada's European Force: 1971-1980, p. 68.

adopting as much or as little defence input as it feels ad hoc circumstances warrant.

It seems evident that the government has yet to reconcile itself to the inseparability of defence and foreign and domestic policy. The rhetoric which surrounded the initial pursuit of the Third Option was matched, at best, by ad hoc purchases. These purchases have not been followed up by a firm commitment to undertake planned, capital equipment replacement and augmentation in the long or even medium-term. One can see in this a further manifestation of the advantage to the politician of the comprehensive rational approach with its focus on means. Purchases can be matched with the requirements dictated by particular circumstances without ever having to address or even raise the issue of a specific defence related end, to which the purchases, in a cumulative sense, are directed. Continued government vacillation on the much-needed frigate replacement program is but one example of this lack of commitment. Nor has the government seriously endeavoured to redress the general neglect of Forces' capabilities, a neglect which was, as mentioned earlier, compounded by the confused defence planning which followed the 1969 review. Somewhat more surprising is the government's reticence to acknowledge the benefits which would accrue to Canadian industry were due attention to be paid to defence requirements. For example, while the government stalls on the patrol frigate program, shipyards in Quebec and the

Maritimes lie virtually idle. One might sympathize to some degree with the fact that government has been faced with several major defence capital equipment purchases in a relatively short space of time, but one cannot help but speculate on the extent to which an awareness of the ongoing rather than simply ad hoc nature of defence - and thereby NATO - requirements might have led to a less financially onerous staged or incremental acquisition process.

It should also be noted that the Third Option has begun to reappear as an important policy consideration. Integral to Prime Minister Trudeau's reorganization for economic development announced in January 1982 is the desire "... to pursue aggressively international export markets and to give greater priority to economic matters in the development of foreign policy."^{2 3 4} An added incentive for renewed attention to this option is to be found in a recently announced U.S. plan to exclude Canada from a new defence industry development program:

The Pentagon plans to break a 40-year tradition by denying Canadian weapons makers access to a new \$2-billion U.S. defence industry development program ... [An] informed source ... suggested a document prepared recently by Dr. Richard De Louer, the Pentagon's research, development and engineering chief, excludes Canadian firms. The source said Canada, with its small military budget of about \$7 billion, has been given a **free ride** on U.S. military research and development projects and therefore is vulnerable to U.S. action ... [Professor Stephen Clarkson of the University of Toronto contends that] Canada's defence industry is incapable of surviving

^{2 3 4}Gordon Osbaldeston, *Reorganizing Canada's Department of External Affairs*, International Journal 37 no. 3 (Summer 1982): 453-54.

without American research, development, design components and machine tools.^{2 3 5}

Should this plan come to fruition it will have serious consequences not only for the survivability of Canadian defence industry, but also for industries such as electronics which derive considerable benefit from the spin-offs from military research and development. In light of the existing economic climate, the loss of any industrial capacity must be a matter of no little concern to the Trudeau government.

What can be said of the relationship between foreign policy and defence policy in the final analysis? That the two are interrelated is evident from the discussion of cooperation in the context of policy advice and even formulation at the senior departmental official level, and from the apparent inseparability of foreign and defence policy on issues which touch upon Canada's relations with Western European members of NATO. It would also seem that at times when the attitude of government has been one of indifference to the relationship between foreign and defence policy, bureaucratic activity in DND and DEA has intensified in response to that indifference. But perhaps the most important lesson learned is that defence policy need not be viewed as something which inhibits the pursuit of foreign policy because it is attuned to defence issues only.

^{2 3 5} *U.S. to exclude Canada in defence development*, Edmonton Journal, 23 April 1983, p. A1.

Rather, defence policy may be perceived as complimentary to overall foreign policy, because it can be shaped to address other than purely defence related issues; for example, economic pursuits.

C. Present Perceptions and Prescription

It is reasonable to argue that greater access to Western European technology and markets will be a major focus of a rejuvenated Third Option, and that meaningful participation in all aspects of NATO will continue to be part of the price of admission. However, the Trudeau government has come under increasing pressure from its NATO allies for failing to fulfill Canada's commitment to the Alliance. Canadian rhetoric on the subject has not been matched by performance, and a continuing focus on policy means rather than ends may in part account for this. Defence policy, such as it is, remains a loose, uncoordinated and ad hoc response to isolated problems. Furthermore, the government is no longer in a position to pick up visible, perhaps more correctly credible, evidence of a commitment to NATO, because the evidence quite simply is not to be had. A combination of neglect over time, disinclination of the present government to redress that neglect, and the double-edge sword of departmental bureaucratic politics, has reduced the capability of Canada's armed forces to a level unparalleled since the inter-war years. In a recent address to the Canadian

Defence Associations, Minister of Defence, Gilles Lamontagne, "... focussed on the gut-issue of Canadian defence which he said was to be, the level of forces which should, and can, be maintained to ensure the credibility of our contribution to deterrence."^{2 3 6} But what has been the response of Lamontagne's Cabinet colleagues?

... [T]he Minister announced that Cabinet had agreed, in principle, that the Canadian Forces should be able to meet and sustain their commitments in an emergency and, if so directed, to further expand [sic] their capabilities. This significant policy decision ... was reinforced by the allocation of an additional \$20 Million in 1984/85 specifically for increased readiness and sustainability. This will provide for a gradual improvement of Canadian defence capabilities and force levels available to sustain our international undertakings.^{2 3 7}

In noting phrases such as in principle, if so directed, and a gradual improvement, one is reminded of the European comment in 1976 that, "... your country has a reputation for putting things off."^{2 3 8} And to describe an agreement in principle as a significant policy decision is at best a tenuous assertion. Bluntly put, Canada's NATO allies will not accept rhetoric this time; the free ride is over, and half-fare is no less remote a possibility.

Where does this leave Canada? In the context of defence perhaps nowhere, and in terms of diversification of

^{2 3 6} *More emphasis on Total Force: MND, Reservist - The National Militia Newspaper* Vol. 9 no. 3, Mobile Command, St. Hubert, Quebec, February 1983. p. 3. (My emphasis)

^{2 3 7} Ibid. (My emphasis)

^{2 3 8} Nickerson, *Great praise for Canada's NATO forces*, Halifax Chronicle Herald, p. 23 as cited in Stewart, Canada's European Force: 1971-1980, p. 103.

trading partners, at least constrained. The government could and has contended that the existing economic climate makes it difficult for the government to justify reallocation of financial resources, particularly to an area such as defence. However, the Senate Subcommittee First Report suggests not only that such a reallocation must occur, but also that the cost might not be as onerous as one might think.²³⁹ In addition, an application of a more positive corporate planning approach which enables rather than imposes, might provide a further source of justification. Were DND and External Affairs able to communicate careful and objective strategic study and analysis, to put forward well considered foreign and defence policy proposals to a receptive government, the latter might well be provided not only with the necessary justification, but also with a more profound appreciation of the viable role which defence policy can and must play in overall policy considerations. Such an approach would tap the positive aspects of bureaucratic politics, rather than stimulating counter-productive departmental activity as has tended to be the case in the past.

How would it be operationalized? Positive corporate planning, learning how to learn, is linked to cybernetics, and as a theoretical back-drop to cybernetics one can draw upon critical theory. The latter might be treated as a thesis in itself, but an overview of it will suffice to -----

²³⁹Canada, Senate, First Report, p. 45. See associated Table, p. 95.

illustrate its prescriptive possibilities. Critical theory has its roots in the Weberian tradition in that it is connected with what Weber perceives as the one positive aspect of rationalization - intellectualization.

Intellectualization can lead to an intellectual awareness of reality; the real world. The problem with rationalized, scientific approaches is that they focus, as does the incrementalist approach, on the "... the measurable facts of public policies or the manifest behaviour of organizational actors ... [and] thus they implicitly endorse the social conditions which have created those facts and those behaviours."²⁴⁰ This precludes the development of broadly based policies because there is a tendency to consider only those policies which appear to be solvable through applying positivist social science methods. "Under such circumstances, technical concerns would replace political and ethical concerns as the basis for public decision-making, thereby transforming normative issues into technical problems."²⁴¹ Furthermore, over-emphasis on technical consciousness and measurable outcomes obscures the more important consideration of mutual understanding on the part of politicians and bureaucrats.

Rather than emphasizing order and regulation, a critical approach would concentrate on the characteristic conditions of contemporary organizational life, power and

²⁴⁰Robert B. Denhardt, *Toward a Critical Theory of Public Organization*, Public Administration Review 41 no. 6 (November/December 1981): 633.

²⁴¹Ibid.

dependence and the potential for conflict and disorder - interchange rather than interface of the natures of the political and bureaucratic worlds - which these conditions imply.²⁴² "[A] critical approach would insist on highlighting those aspects of bureaucratic theory and practice which serve to limit the individual's recognition of and contribution to the process of governing."²⁴³ Through identifying the ways in which alienation results from current political-bureaucratic relationships, a critical theory would offer direction in improving that relationship. An obvious area for analysis is the often flawed pattern of communication between the political and bureaucratic spheres, and here the critical approach could suggest a management style which assists organizations in cybernetically learning how to learn. Such an educative style of management would involve critical self-reflection on the part of both the manager and managed, and would help them to perceive the constraints of their respective environments - to see themselves and their social situation in a new way. Most importantly, in a political and bureaucratic context, it might bring home to the politician the necessary appreciation of values and his role in specifying them which an appeal to positivism obscures, and it might emphasize the benefits of real corporate involvement, thereby creating a positive as opposed to a negative bureaucratic input. In a broad sense the

²⁴² Ibid.

²⁴³ Ibid.

decisional process would give due consideration to the real influence of organizational processes and bureaucratic political activity, and corporate policy planning would be exercised in fact and not merely form.

One very important factor may undermine the appeal of critical theorizing, and that is the desire to retain power. A truly corporate approach, particularly a corporate - political-bureaucratic - exercise in critical self-reflection, may well be too suggestive of over-democratization of the governmental process for most politicians' liking. For the politician who is more concerned with power or means than with the values or ends which might be said to be embodied in the corporate good, a comprehensive rational approach must continue to appeal because it affords the politician a pseudo-scientific explanation of why things happen the way they do and the results. The approach is thereby a sort of psychological crutch which allows the politician to absolve himself, not only in his own eyes but also in those of the public, of responsibility for the results which are produced. It also it affords the retention of power, the ability to control. A desire for power or to retain power is understandable in the sense that power is part of the reality of the social world, but even here critical theorizing may be salutary because critical self-reflection may help the politician to understand the pitfalls of the rational pursuit of power - what might be termed the politician's personal devil. Weber

termed it thus: "Mind you, the Devil is old; grow old to understand him."^{2 4 4} If it can be assumed that power is the focus of Mr. Trudeau, as his attitude towards his cabinet colleagues and his efforts to control the bureaucracy would suggest, then it may be anticipated that he will continue to be "lured by the fresh promises" of a rationalization which might somehow be harmonized with the reality of incremental change, which he has found cannot be ignored. And if the government pursues politics with a passion characterized by sterile excitation and "devoid of all feeling of objective responsibility," as one might argue it has been wont to do in relation to foreign and defence policy, it may rightly be accused of political dilettantism. In the final analysis such a government "... [will not have] measured up to the world as it is in its everyday routine. Objectively and actively [its members will not] have experienced the vocation of politics in its deepest meaning which they thought they had."^{2 4 5}

To return to specifics, if the Trudeau government marches to the beat of an indifferent if not irresponsible drummer, Canada's military commitment to NATO, and defence policy in general, will march to the tunes of "I got plenty of nothing," and "It ain't necessarily so." And this is a musical accompaniment to which European members of NATO, on whose economic if not military support Canada may well become increasingly dependent, have long since turned a deaf

^{2 4 4}Gerth and Mills, From Max Weber, p. 152.

^{2 4 5}Ibid., p. 128.

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